



## The Arab Spring And The Challenges Of Good Governance In Africa (2011-2014)

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**ABSTRACT:-** This research focused on assessing the impact of the Arab Spring on good governance in Africa, between 2011 and 2014. This research examined the nature of the Arab Spring and the challenges of good governance in Africa, to decipher whether there is a link between the exclusion of the majority from political participation and the Arab Spring. This research is a qualitative research and data was collected from documented evidences (secondary sources). Frustration-aggression theory as a framework of analysis was used in the research. To achieve this, questions like: Was the “Arab Spring” revolution a consequence of lack of good governance in the region? Is there any link between the exclusion of the majority from political participation and the Arab Spring? were raised in the research. Our assumed premises are: the Arab Spring was a direct consequence of lack of good governance; there is a positive link between the quest for popular participation in governance and the Arab Spring. The content method of analysis was adopted. Promotion of transparency, accountability, responsible government that recognizes the rule of law was recommended.

**Keywords:** Arab spring, good governance, political participation and transparency.

### I. INTRODUCTION

The wave of revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa that began in January 2011, otherwise referred to as “The Arab Spring”, has raised a lot of questions concerning the quality of governance in Africa, on one hand, and the implication of lack of good governance in the continent. The uprisings are subsequent profound changes in the Middle East and North Africa had signaled a new order, with countries redefining themselves and restoring self-esteem and a sense of community. Transitional periods were always difficult, with questions arising on how to proceed with and establish systems of good governance, which would advance peace and security and bring about economic prosperity and new and more responsive political elite [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6].

According to [7, 8, 9, 10], good governance is important for countries at all stages of development. Definitions of good governance could generally be categorized in one of two groups: the first defining good governance from the perspective of economic development, with a focus on accountability, control, addressing corruption, and resource management efficiency; the second defining it from an institutional and bureaucratic perspective, with a focus on participations, transparency and openness. What all the definitions had in common, however, was a reference to good governance as responsive governance, underscoring the rule of law, an independent judiciary, the promotion of development, efficient delivery of services and free and fair elections. Nevertheless, some critics had claimed that those definitions were based on western, liberal, democratic models of good governance and did not take account of social, historical or cultural differences between nations, stressing the need for peoples and countries to determine their own political future and that democracy should reflect the diversity of countries’ histories and cultures [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. Regarding the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa, it was hard to generalize the common causes, but economic and social disaffection among people, in particular the youth, was certainly a significant factor [18, 19 and 20].

The demonstrators had initially demanded economic reform, more jobs and an end to corruption, [21, 22, 23, 24]. Those came in response to the global financial crisis, resulting in considerable reductions in subsidies for food, fuel and electricity. Other factors included oppressive authoritarian regimes in some countries, leading to demands for constitutional reform, an end to emergency laws, and measures to redress social inequalities.

In drawing lessons from the uprisings, governments needed to identify the socio-economic factors and lower the risk of social tension in the future by redistributing wealth across society, creating more jobs and alleviating poverty. Western societies and models of democracy had lost their credibility in the eyes of the Arab world, largely as a result of interference in the internal affairs of a number of countries in the region. Instead, other models, such as of the one adopted by Turkey, were viewed as a good example of liberal but Islamic democracies that Arab countries could replicate. Promoting and practicing good governance entails implementing a solid legal framework for institutions and procedures, upholding the constitution, organizing free and fair elections and respecting their results [25, 26, 27 and 28]. A number of institutions had set their own definitions of good governance, but all made reference to the process by which power was exercised. The World Bank, for example, in its definition, identified three distinct aspects of governance: type of political regime; how authority was exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development; and the government's capacity to design, formulate and implement policies and discharge function. Good governance could be understood as responsive governance, comprising certain key characteristics, including accountability and transparency, broad popular participation in political processes, a fair and efficient system of justice and enforcement of the rule of law. A number of factors had led to the protests that had taken place in the Middle East and North Africa, including human rights violations, dictatorships, government corruption, economic decline, unemployment, poverty, and structural demographic elements, such as a high percentage of educated but unemployed and disenchanting young people. A number of lessons on democracy and freedom could be drawn from those events, including the need for reform and for democratic governments that responded to the will of the people and had their foundations in respect for human rights and the rule of law. Governments in that region needed to address urgently issues of poverty, corruption and lack of access to essential services, including health.

They also needed to provide basic employment opportunities to all citizens and safeguard freedom of expression and tolerance in society. Such changes would require extensive reforms of constitutions, electoral and judicial systems, and the media, while ensuring that the place of women in all aspects of political life was enhanced considerably. Against this backdrop, therefore, this study will critically examine the impact of the Arab spring on good governance in Africa which is the antidote to such revolutions, and the extent the revolution has influenced nations to embrace reforms

## **II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM**

One of the biggest obstacles to Africa's development has always been the issue of democracy and good governance. The year 2011 saw dramatic changes in Africa's governance landscape. Unprecedented popular demonstrations in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya led to the overturning of a century of autocratic rule in North Africa. These protests, demanding greater political freedom, economic opportunity, and an end to systemic corruption, have resonated deeply across Africa, sparking calls for change throughout the continent [29, 30, 31, 32]. Already home to more of the world's democratizing states than any other region, even modest reverberations from the Arab spring on Africa's democratic trajectory will have implications for global governance norms, stability, and development [33, 34]. As at February 2012, governments have been overthrown in four countries. Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia on 14 January 2011 following the Tunisian revolution protests. In Egypt, President Hosni Mubarak resigned on 11 February 2011 after 18 days of massive protests, ending his 30 year presidency. The Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown on 23 August 2011, after the National Transitional Council (NTC) took control of Bab al-Azizia. He was killed on 20 October 2011, in his hometown of Sirte after the NTC took control of the city. Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh signed the GCC power-transfer deal in which a presidential election was held, resulting in his successor Abd al-Rab Mansur al-Hadi formally replacing him as the President of Yemen on 27 February 2012, in exchange for immunity from prosecution.

During this period of regional unrest, several leaders announced their intentions to step down at the end of their current terms. Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir announced that he would not seek re-election in 2015, as did Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, whose term ended in 2014, although there have been increasingly violent demonstrations demanding his immediate resignation. Protests in Jordan have also caused the sacking of two successive governments by King Abdullah.

The geopolitical implications of the protests have drawn global attention, including the suggestion that some protesters may be nominated for the 2011 Nobel peace Prize. Tawakel Karman from Yemen was one of the three laureates of the 2011 Nobel peace prize as a prominent leader in the Arab Spring. In December 2011, *Time* magazine named "The Protester" its "Person of the Year".

Another award was noted when the Spanish photographers Samuel Aranda, won the 2011 World Press Photo award for his image of a Yemeni woman holding an injured family member, taken during the civil uprising in Yemen on 15 October 2011. According to Kaye (2012), [9], The Arab Spring had been momentous but there were still challenges ahead, including the promotion of good governance, a concept that many regimes had tried to ignore as they had with the people's demands for liberty and reform. The Egyptian people for example had never experienced good governance in its true sense. It was instead a term used by the government to mask its corruption and mislead citizens and international community. Accountability and oversight mechanisms had been implemented only to ensure that Egypt was looked upon favourably by the rest of the world [35, 36, 37]. While the regime had promoted human rights publicly, it continued to undermine the dignity of its citizens; discrimination was wide-spread and there was a lack of equality. Despite steady economic growth in recent years, the socio-economic situation of the vast majority of the population had steadily worsened, with most of growth and wealth going to a few. Before the uprisings, the political situation had been deadlocked: the regime had had the monopoly of power and control of all State security apparatuses, emergency laws meant that 17,000 citizens had been imprisoned without trial and political prisoners had numbered about 25,000. The political situation came to a head during 2010 parliamentary elections, when fraudulent practices saw the ruling party win 97 percent of seats and all opposition excluded.

Private media outlets had only been allowed in Egypt within the last decade and, initially, could only be established under State supervision. However, newspapers and television channels had captured people's interest and expanded. The regime outwardly promoted freedom of expression; but in reality a considerably number of persons in independent media had been jailed, fined, or had been the subjects of smear campaigns by the State. There is a key difference between protests in democratic and undemocratic States: in the former, protests generally led to developments in the regime and consideration of protesters' views, while in the latter, regimes often ignored or failed to respond to protester's requests, often leading to a deepening crisis. However, a lot has been written about the challenges of good governance in Africa, as according to [38, 39, 40], one of Africa's challenges is to embrace the inherent democratic values of our different cultures, and to adapt them to suit both national circumstances and today's global interdependency. Overall, some of the major governance challenges include addressing the human rights issue, particularly the rights of women and children; elimination of corruption; poor service delivery; peace and stability; shortage of skilled labour; independence and effectiveness of oversight functions of regulatory bodies; inadequate business rules and regulations; integration of traditional institutions into modern governance system; need by civil society organizations improve internal governance; prevalence of capacity deficits in governance institutions, especially electoral institutions, judiciary, parliamentary, civil service and media organizations [41, 42, 43, 44, 45]. Underlying the litany of Africa's development problems is a crisis of good governance, which entails the exercise of political power in recognition of the fundamental right of the citizens to manage a nation's affairs. Because countervailing power has been lacking, state officials in many countries have served their own interest without fear of being called to account. In self-defense, individuals have built up personal networks of influence rather than hold the all-powerful state accountable for its systemic failure. In this way, politics becomes personalized and patronage becomes essential to maintain power. The leadership assumes broad discretionary authority and loses its legitimacy, information is controlled, and voluntary associations are co-opted or disbanded. The environment cannot readily support a dynamic economy [46, 47, 48]. The World Bank therefore argues that adjustment alone cannot put Africa on a sustained poverty-reducing path; such must be complemented with institution building and good governance [49, 50]. The enormity of the challenges faced by Africa in its new determination to accelerate the momentum of development points to a difficult and daunting task, The Middle East is among the regions where poverty is increasing. The region is also not on track to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). It is a region of huge contrasts, and it is a paradox that it is the richest in terms of resources, and yet poor in terms of living standards. One of the main causes of the regions condition today is that it has been a victim of the self-interest of its exploiters. The richest nations throughout history have used and abused our continent to fuel their own economies, extracting and benefiting from their raw materials and in the process hindering their development and entrenching poverty [51].

Meanwhile, not much has been articulated as to the effect of the foreign interference and exclusion of the majority on the near-failed state status of some states in the Middle East and North Africa, and this constitutes the gap in literature, and which this discussion is premised on the following questions: Has the undemocratic history of the Arab countries implicated on the Arab spring?; Is there any link between the exclusion of the majority from political participation and the Arab Spring?

### **III. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY**

The broad objective of this study is to examine the implication of the Arab Spring on democratizing the Middle East, while the specific objectives are:

- I To ascertain whether the undemocratic history of the Arab countries implicated on the Arab spring
- II To establish whether there is a link between the exclusion of the majority from political participation and the Arab Spring.

### **IV. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY**

It is hoped that successful completion of this research study will afford us the opportunity to establish what led to the Arab Spring as well as the need for policy and structural reforms that will ensure good governance in Africa. Therefore, the significance of this study covers both theoretical and practical importance. Theoretically, this study is systematically designed to give readers thorough knowledge of the remote causes of the Arab Spring. The work will be of immense value and benefit, and will serve as reference material to students of Political Science, Public Administration and Government who may undertake similar research, as well as the general public who may find it relevant to contemporary issues in the development of the Middle East. Practically, this study will serve as launching pad for African governments to review their structural and policy direction. This work will assist both the government and the people to evaluate the degree of success or failure of the Arab Spring.

### **V. MATERIALS AND METHODS**

#### **Theoretical Framework of Analysis**

Different theories have been adopted at different fora as analytic tools for the explanation of the Arab Spring, but this study employs the frustration-aggression model to fully explicate on issues arising from the Arab Spring. The frustration-aggression theory is one of the most popular behavioural explanatory frameworks in the study of violence and civil unrest.

In 1939, Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears published a monograph on aggression in which they presented what has come to be known as the frustration-aggression hypothesis (F-A). This hypothesis proved to have an immense impact. It appears to have influenced current Western thinking on aggression more profoundly than any other single publication. For more than three decades, the F-A hypothesis has guided, in one way or another, the better part of the experimental research on human aggression [15 and 16]. Perhaps more importantly, however, the views of aggression that it involves seem to have become widely adopted and accepted; they have become commonplaces. This popular success may have various sources. First the principal hypothesis is uncomplicated and easy to grasp. The theory is generally well structured and clearly articulated, a fact that again facilitates comprehension. Second, the theory does not involve overly abstract concepts or elaborate procedures. It is very close to common sense-seeming to be built on it. Finally, as [13], observed, the theory tends to provide a justification for behaving aggressively: 'Being frustrated made me do it!' for example, the self immolation of the Tunisian unemployed graduate, Mohamed Bouazizi, which triggered off widespread protests across the country that eventually led to the stepping aside of the president, can only be as a result of frustration, which ultimately brought out the aggressiveness in him. Like the aggression amnesty provided by instinct notions ('It can't be helped because we're built that way'), although not as strong, this kind of justification can be drawn upon as a ready-made excuse for uncontrolled (or premeditated) hostile or aggressive actions [12]. As to the principal hypothesis, [10], posited "that the occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration and, contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression". Frustration, in this context, was specified as the thwarting of a goal response, and a goal response, in turn, was taken to mean the reinforcing final operation in an ongoing behavior sequence. In this case, the case of Egypt comes to mind, President Hosni Mubarak has ruled the country for thirty years and majority of the masses felt aggrieved as the regime continued to undermine the dignity of its citizens, discrimination was widespread and there was a lack of equality. At times, however, the term 'frustration' is used to refer not only to the process of blocking a person's attainment of a reinforce but also to the reaction to such blocking. Consequently, 'being frustrated' means both that one's access to reinforce is being thwarted by another party (or possibly by particular circumstances) and that one's reaction to this thwarting is one of annoyance. In Libya, there it was hard to generalize the common causes, but economic and social disaffection among people; in particular the youth was a significant factor, [17]. It was soon recognized that the initial claims- (a) that aggression is always based on frustration and (b) that frustration always leads to aggression- were far too general. These claims made frustration both a necessary and sufficient condition for aggression. Quite obviously, frustrations do not cause hostile or aggressive outbursts by necessity. Potential outbursts may be effectively inhibited or may result in alternative actions, such as the pursuit of other, more readily available reinforcers, like the case of Morocco, in a live televised address, King Mohammed announced that he would

begin a comprehensive constitutional reform aimed at improving democracy and the rule of law. He promised to form a commission to work on constitutional revisions, which would make proposals to him, after which a referendum would be held on the draft constitution. Miller therefore rephrased the second part of the hypothesis to read: "Frustration produces instigations to a number of different types of response, one of which is instigation to some form of aggression". The theoretical treatment of the inhibition of aggression is related to the time issue, in that the lack of immediate, overt manifestations of aggression is assumed to lead to prolonged covert consequences that eventually 'break out' in different form. Dollard et al. recognized that *not all* frustrations produce *overt* aggression, and to account for this fact, they posited inhibitory forces whose strength was said to vary positively with the severity of the punishment anticipated to result from the particular contemplated goal reaction. It was proposed that if punishment (a notion that was broadened to include such things as injury to a loved object and failure to achieve desired objectives) was anticipated to outweigh any incentives that could be gained, overt aggression would be inhibited. However, consistent with the original conviction that all frustrations produce some form of aggression, Dollard et al insisted that it would be 'clearly false' to view inhibited overt aggression as nonaggression. Being 'furious inside', for example, is interpreted as no overt aggression, which apparently can linger on and erupt in overt manifestations at a later time. According to this reformulation, frustration actuates motivational forces that are *diffuse* rather than specific to aggression. It is assigned the properties of a *general* drive. Such apparent moderation has not been applied to the first part of the original F-A hypothesis, however. The revised F-A hypothesis thus maintains the following: (a) Frustration instigates behavior that may or may not be hostile or aggressive, like most of the 'occupy' protests across the globe, (b) Any hostile or aggressive behavior that occurs is caused by frustration. In other words, frustration is not a sufficient, but a necessary, condition for hostility and aggression [12]. As evidenced by the widespread revolts currently sweeping across the Middle east and north Africa, which is already spreading to other parts of Africa. The masses are tired and frustrated as a result of government's corruption and are demanding for popular participation in governance.

Therefore, based on the foregoing, we are going to use this theoretical framework to investigate the hypotheses, as stated below.

### **Hypotheses**

For the purpose of harmonizing theoretical framework, with empirical reality, we postulate that:

- A. The undemocratic history of the Arab countries has implications on the Arab spring.
- B. There is a positive link between the quest for popular participation in governance and the Arab Spring.

### **Method of Data Collection**

In this study, we shall make use of secondary method of data collection. We shall use official document from the internet, existing literature in form of journals, textbooks, newspapers and magazines, electronic media, unpublished documents, as well as government publications, which are considered relevant to the research study.

### **Method of Data Analysis**

Data analysis shall be on descriptive basis. It will be analytical based on reading meaning into every detail of information from the available document made available by scholars on good governance and civil unrest. The work depends solely on this method because of its historical nature, comparing and contrasting the events leading up to the crisis.

## **VI. CONCLUSION**

This study investigated the nature and character of the Arab Spring revolution and the challenges of good governance in Africa, with the purpose of establishing whether there is a link between the Arab Spring and lack of good governance. In the light of the problems inherent in the political leadership landscape of the countries studied, this study therefore was specifically directed at ascertaining the linkage between the quest for popular participation in governance and the Arab Spring, and to establish whether lack of good governance led to the revolution. To adequately investigate our problem as stated in chapter one, we posited the following hypotheses: The Arab Spring was a direct consequence of lack of good governance; there is a positive link between the quest for popular participation in governance and the Arab Spring. The frustration-aggression theory was used to streamline our investigation. The theory enabled us to study, understand and explicate the basic ingredients and or factors that condition good governance and the inevitable consequences of aggression or aggressive tendencies that often arise for lack of it. To adequately address the above stated issues, the study was subdivided into five chapters. Chapter one dwelt on methodological issues. Chapter two evaluated the Arab Spring, taking a historical context, a prognosis of the nature and character of the politics of the region from the 19<sup>th</sup> century reforms through much of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the path to modernity and authority, to the cycle of

political exclusion leading up to the quest for change. Chapter three evaluated the leadership failure of the states and the Arab Spring thereby analyzing the first hypothesis. Chapter four examined the trend of political exclusion and popular agitation and then tested the second hypothesis. In analyzing the data, it was discovered that good governance was nonexistent in the region and the people have been on the edge for long, as [10], observed, “the people of Egypt for example had never experienced good governance in its true sense, it was a term the government used to mask its corruption and mislead citizens and the international community”. Similar frustrations abound in the region, not forgetting the Tunisian food vendor Mohamed Bouazizi whose self immolation served as the last straw that broke the camel’s back, before the people started venting their spleen on the regimes. From the above analysis, it became obvious that good governance was lacking and this validates the first hypothesis. Secondly, the refusal of longstanding dictators to relinquish power, or engage in popular reforms, even against popular demands, but using the machinery of the state to their whims and caprices and political exclusion, fueled even more resentment on the people. In analyzing the events leading to the Arab Spring, it is pertinent to recall that President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali had ruled Tunisia since 1987. In Egypt, Hosni Mubarak became head of Egypt’s semi-presidential republic government following the 1981 assassination of President Anwar El Sadat, and continued to serve until 2011. Mubarak’s 30-year reign made him the longest-serving President in Egypt’s history, with his National Democratic Party (NDS) government maintaining one-party rule under a continuous state of emergency. Muammar Gaddafi became the de-facto ruler of Libya after he led a military coup that overthrew King Idris I in 1969. He abolished the Libyan Constitution of 1951, and adopted laws based on his own ideology outlined in his manifesto *The Green Book*. The self imposition of these rulers on their people led to alienating the people from governance, as governance was left in the hands of a few individuals thereby validating the second hypothesis which states that there is a positive link between the quest for popular participation in governance and the Arab Spring [6].

## VII. RECOMMENDATION

The ousting of longtime autocratic leaders in North Africa over the course of 2011 combined with democratic breakthroughs in a half dozen Sub-Saharan African countries have reshaped the contours of Africa’s governance landscape. Underlying drivers of change, moreover, suggest that the prospects for further democratic advances in the next few years are strong. Nonetheless, the legacy of neopatrimonial governing models continues to loom large in Africa. The concentration of power in a single individual serves to simultaneously perpetuate personalistic governance while stunting the development of political institutions needed to create checks and balances. Overcoming these entrenched norms is the central obstacle facing Africa’s democratic transitions.

While riveting, none of Africa’s recent democratic gains are assured. Revolutions are often the starting point and not the finish line of democratic transitions. The process of consolidating democratic institutions is typically decades-long. Experience shows that this sequence is commonly marked by gains and setbacks. Pushback from those who thrived from close ties to former regimes should be expected. At the same time, democratic setbacks are not necessarily the final act-but another step in the sequence of citizens learning their roles and responsibilities in a self-governing political system.

The legacy of “big-man’ rule is also a central challenge for some of Africa’s relatively more advanced democracies. Having grown accustomed to power and its seductions, even some of Africa’s more reformist leaders have vied to extend their time in office. In the process, whether intentional or not, the effect is to weaken nascent constraints on executive authority and invigorate cronyistic networks. The future trajectory of democratic governance in Africa, therefore, will be determined by the tension between these competing forces-the emerging drivers of change and the status quo concentration of executive authority. While some have been disappointed that mass protests along the order of those seen in North Africa have not been replicated in Sub-Saharan Africa, this is a poor indicator of democratic potential. Democracy is not achieved by one-time surges of activity but by the sustained and cohesive political engagement of its citizens.

Key actors that will shape this engagement include civil society networks, political parties, regional and international partners, the media, and the security sector. By instituting greater constraints on executive authority, especially with regards to extending their terms in office, reformers can help strengthen incentives for political leaders to attain legitimacy, govern democratically, and leave power at the end of their constitutionally mandated terms. As this norm is deepened, semi-authoritarian leaders are facing greater pressure to adopt genuine democratic practices, or to facilitate smooth transitions from power. Indeed, one of the most revealing lessons from the transitions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and elsewhere pertains directly to the region’s remaining autocrats and semi-authoritarians. Namely, those leaders who stay too long are likely to depart on terms considerably less favorable to themselves. Former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, stated that good governance was perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development and a key element of ensuring peace, stability and security. That statement was perhaps more true today than when it was articulated in the late 1990s. The concept of good governance is as old as civilization. Key attributes were

participation, predictability, and responsiveness, the rule of law, equity, strategic vision and leadership. Good governance is critical to any form of government and should not be neglected; it is an indicator of democracy and closely related to how power is exercised. It is, among other things, transparent, accountable, participatory, effective and efficient, as well as responsive. Political upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa had shown that failure of governments to implement tenets of good governance could lead to political imbalance and social instability. Such upheavals were caused by factors such as socio-economic instability, or political motivation to end a regime. Good governance could be used as a means of advancing peace and security. Through the promotion of transparency, accountability, responsibility and the rule of law, the social, economic and political barriers that threaten peace and security could be removed. From the study so far, there is an indisputable correlation between governance and peace and security. The former also led to economic, social and political advancement and empowerment, thus diminishing the likelihood of instability. Governments should work towards fulfilling citizen demands for accountable and transparent governance systems. Access to economic and political resources should be guaranteed to all members of society. Freedom of expression and the right to political participation should be respected; all members of society should have an equal opportunity to participate in their country's political and economic affairs without discrimination. The world had witnessed regime changes in Tunisia and Egypt, but instability and internal strife continues in Bahrain, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen etc. Those events showed the monumental evolution in the political tapestry of the region. With the fall of communist regimes and the end of the Cold War, it was hoped that the double standards of judging authoritarian regimes based on whether they were on friendly terms with the communist bloc or with the West had ended. However, the foreign policy of supporting "friendly dictatorships" has survived. Instead of supporting its own values, the West counted on stability guaranteed by corrupt tyrants. That was most probably because the West believed that the Arab world was beyond hope and change. However, the Arab Spring had proved that nothing lasted forever. The Middle East and North Africa had risen up against dictators and many western countries were faced with a dilemma: how to signal support for people who revolted against political oppression, corruption, social inequality and a distant political elite while appearing not to abandon their traditional allies. The clash of idealism and pragmatism within the foreign policy therefore led to confusion and an inability to deal with current developments. Undoubtedly the events of the Jasmine Revolution did not mean an automatic victory for democracy, the rule of law and human rights in the way they were understood by western civilizations. Indeed, in Tunisia, modernity met with traditional ways of life, and universality and openness with strict religious rules and demands. Instead of a prosperous life, to which most people aspired, the changes in society could trigger further social turbulence, periods of instability and uncertainty and an overall degradation of already poor living standards. The international community must shift from supporting friendly dictatorships to supporting good governance strategies. The West should refrain from exporting and imposing its values; countries should be encouraged to seek their own paths. That was the lesson the West should learn from the Arab Spring. Good governance should be applied to the entire international community.

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