



Research Paper

Impact of Sectional Agitation for Self Determination on National Development: A Study of IPOB and MASSOB of South-Eastern Nigeria

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ABSTRACT: The study examined the impacts of sectional agitations for self-determination on national development with reference to IPOB and MASSOB of southeast Nigeria. The study tends to analyze the causes, consequences, impacts and well-made recommendations into the call for Biafra separatism in southeast Nigeria. To understand why agitation for self-determination has been persistent, this study reviewed existing analyses and found that explanation for recurring agitation and its impacts fall into three categories (a) those that focus on ethnicity – ethnic divisions and rivalry (b) those that focus on economic frustrations and (c) those that focus on state-society relations i.e the governments' attitudes towards the society and societal affairs. It employed survey method. Major instrument for data collection was the questionnaire. The study revealed that the agitations for self-determination can be contained if only the Nigerian government would take into consideration the grievances of the separatists and apply all humane measures as recommended towards resolving the conflicts without having to apply military force as it has done in the past and still happening today in our country Nigeria.

KEYWORDS: SECTIONAL AGITATION, SELF DETERMINATION, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, IPOB, MASSOB

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I. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

The recent upsurge in the demand for a separate Biafra state, for self-determination by the Indigenous People of Biafra (MASSOB) calls for an enquiry into the impacts of sectional agitations on national development.

Since November 2015, the Igbo dominated part of Nigeria ie South Eastern Region, has witnessed demonstrations by Biafra separatists mainly IPOB and MASSOB. On 2nd December 2015, the protests degenerated into violence, when two policemen and nine protesters, out of the thousands that had blocked the strategic Niger Bridge in the commercial city of Onitsha in Anambra State, were reportedly killed. Several properties including the city's Central Mosque and eight trucks belonging to Dangote Group, a conglomerate owned by Northern business Aliko Dangote were destroyed during the protests. Since the 2nd of December 2015 incident, several protesters have been reportedly killed in clashes with security forces in Onitsha, Aba, Port Harcourt, Owerri and Asaba. On June 20th Amnesty International accused the Nigerian Military of killing unarmed Biafra supporters in Onitsha ahead of their planned May 2016 commemoration of Biafra. According to [1] opening fire on peaceful IPOB supporters and by standers who clearly posed no threat to anyone is outrageous use of unnecessary and excessive force and resulted in multiple deaths and injuries". To be sure, there is now a history of extrajudicial killings of supporters of Biafra, which predate the present government. For instance, in January 2013 fifty bodies believed to be Biafra supporters were found afloat in the Ezu River in Anambra State [2]. Still, none of the past and present killings have been thoroughly investigated by Nigerian government.

The immediate trigger of the recent protests by Biafra separatisms was the 19 October 2015 arrest of Nnamdi Kanu, leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and director of Web-based Radio Biafra, on

charges of sedition, ethnic incitement, and treasonable felony. The IPOB and radio Biafra represent the highest profile and radical movement for a separate Biafra state of Biafra that currently exists. The IPOB and Radio Biafra stepped – up a struggle championed by the Movement for Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) formed by Ralph Uwazulike in 1999. Although MASSOB based its struggle on a non – violence pledges, its members, alleging provocation, have clashed repeatedly with police – these clashed have resulted to several deaths.

A combination of state repression and internal dissent weakened MASSOB and introduced deep cracks in its organization on 30th November 2015, a major faction tried to expel Uwazurike, alleging that he had compromised the secessionist struggle and deviated into the mainstream of Nigerian politics. The attempted expulsion of Uwazulike was preceded by the information of another faction in September 2010 calling itself the Biara Zionist Movement BZM). On 5th November 2012 BZM leader Benjamin Igwe Onwuka and about 100 members were arrested and charged with treason after the group “re-declared the Republic of Biafra” at a rally in Enugu. They were later released on bail. But on 8th March 2014, Onwuka and other BZM members were again arrested and placed on trial for attempting to seize on Enugu state owned radio station and broadcast of another Biafra declaration.

The detention of BZF members has led to decline of the group’s activities. However, the weakening of MASSOB and BZF seems to have opened way for IPOB to continue the agitation. The protests by IPOB have heightened security fears and tensions in the Southeast and Niger Delta regions of Nigeria and put pressure on the Nigerian government to deal with the agitation.

The latest strong rise in the demand for self-determination by IPOB and MASSOB gives us reason to understand why the agitation has persisted, nearly 50 years after the end of the Nigerian civil war. The impact of the recurring agitation and possible remedies, being the longest active separatist movement in Nigeria, the persistence of Biafra separatism, it discusses the impact of the recurring agitation for Biafra on National development and suggests what the Nigerian government and other actors should do to resolve Biafra separatism.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The renewed agitation for Biafra and the demand for restructuring of the Nigerian federal system triggered our research into this topic. Based on the above reason some of the problems include ethnic divisions and competition and rivalry amongst the major tribes in Nigeria ie Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba. Economic frustration of South easterners in Nigeria by the Nigerian government and economic policies, some of the economic policies in Nigeria does not favor the business and economic activities of the South Easterner (Igbos) whom are majorly business oriented than any other tribe in Nigeria. These as well gave rise to the clamour for secession in order to have better environment to uplift them.

Collective victimization and separatist feelings in the south-eastern region, Nigeria, the southeast made up of mainly Igbos appears to be in a state of collective victimization. They sense that they are not recognized by the federal government based on political and ministerial appointments, lack of federal projects in the region and this raises the feeling of been marginalized by the Federal Government of Nigeria and this aided in the renewed agitation for self-determination by IPOB and MOSSOB.

Non-Igbo president since 1999 when the military government handed over to civilian government in Nigeria the Igbos (south-eastern) of Nigeria have not been able to rule Nigeria. The country has been led by mostly Hausa and Yoruba. No Igbo has been democratically elected to rule the country. Sectional agitators feel they have no place in the Nigeria government and so result to self-determination as the best option.

Contracting economic opportunities in the region, which has seen a very high level of unemployment even among highly educated young people, account for proneness of the area to separatist agitations and insecurity, this is deepened by a perception that other parts of the country are unduly privileged. It is widely acknowledged that groups are more likely to rebel when they feel disadvantaged vis-à-vis other groups in the society.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

This study is focused on the impact of sectional agitations for self-determination on National Development by IPOB and MASSOB of south-eastern Nigeria.

The specific objectives are:

1. To examine the reasons for sectional agitations for self-determination in the southeast of Nigeria by IPOB and MASSOB.
2. To examine the impact of sectional agitations of IPOB and MASSOB on national development.
3. To identify the driving force for sectional agitation for self-determination.

1.4 Research Questions

1. What is/are the reasons for sectional agitations for self-determination in south-east Nigeria by IPOB and MASSOB?
2. What are the impacts of sectional agitation of IPOB and MASSOB on national development?
3. What are the elements driving the call for self-determination by IPOB and MASSOB in south-east Nigeria?

1.5 Significance of the Study

The study has both theoretical and practical significance.

Theoretically the study will be of much importance to political analysts and students in general. It will as well serve as a reference point on issues that deal with self-determination and enhance further studies.

Practically, the study is important to the masses to let them understand the causes for sectional agitation by IPOB and MASSOB, their impacts and effect.

Policy makers who come across this study will understand why various policies do not suit the sectional agitators and so the study will guide them in making better efficient and effective policies that will cover the interest of all IPOB and MASOB who claim to represent the interest of the southeast Nigeria will find this study relevant as it discusses their goals, what they stand for and their impact toward national development in Nigeria.

1.6 Hypotheses

Ho: Sectional agitation for self-determination by IPOB and MASSOB is not justifiable.

H1: Sectional agitation for self-determination by IPOB and MASSOB is justifiable

Ho: There is no association between sectional agitation by IPOB and MASSOB and national development.

H2: There is an association between sectional agitation by IPOB and MASSOB and national development.

Ho: IPOB and MASSOB are not the only elements driving the call for self-determination in southeast Nigeria

H3: IPOB and MASSOB are the only elements driving the call for self-determination

1.7 Scope of Study

This study cuts across the impact of IPOB and MASSOB, south-eastern Nigeria, reasons for sectional agitations and impact on national development in Nigeria.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

Conflict theory was adopted in this study conflict theories give special importance to materialist interpretation of history, dialectical method of analysis, a critical stance towards existing social arrangements, and political program of revolution or reform. Wright Mills the founder of modern conflict theory has this to say "social structures are created through conflict between people with differing interests and resources. Individuals and resources, in turn are influenced by these structures and by the unequal distribution of power and resources in the society" [3].

Sectional agitators (IPOB and MASSOB) are in conflict with the Nigerian government, they say that the social structure of Nigerian does not favour the southeast, the interests of the Igbos and that of Hausas and Yoruba's differ, there is unequal distribution of resources amongst the society and power distribution is not fair. The Igbos are highly marginalized, and this brings constant conflict because they feel they have no place in Nigeria government and sought to self-determination as best option.

[4] says that "wars inflict high costs on combatants and their supporters could exacerbate animosity and create a strong desire for retribution even after ward ends". This explains the reason why the Biafra agitators even after the civil war that claimed many lives and properties still fell grievances and its unlikely to subsidize well if not properly addressed. [5] and Charles Tilly (1978) argue that "government which are willing to address and settle key rebel grievance are more likely to avoid renewed agitation than governments that leave important grievances unsettled".

This posits why the Biafra issue keeps recurring. The Nigerian government is yet to address the issue properly. According [6] Hobsbawm explains that Nationalism comes before nation, in the sense that an ethnic group must be somehow politically mobilized before it becomes a nation. The mobilization occurs in forms of some sort of recognized collective objectives as perceived by an ethnic group that feels marginalized in a heterogeneous society.

This basically defines the Nigeria/Biafra saga, IPOB and MASSOB have a collective objective, and both parties are politically conscious and mobilized, seeking the secession of Igbo people from the

heterogeneous state of Nigeria because they feel marginalized. The Igbo nationalism is intensified because of politics of exclusion played by the Nigeria government. The resurgence of Igbo nationalism is spearheaded by MASSOB, a youthful and radical organization of succeeding generations of Igbos who fought the civil war, is as a result of their frustration in the Nigerian entity and perception that existing political structure that seeming consign the Igbo to a lower status that it deserves vis a vis other groups is illegitimate.

[7] articulated four clear dimension that display causes and impacts of sectional agitation in south eastern Nigeria, Economic strangulation, politico-bureaucratic emasculation, military neutralization and ostracism. The above brings to light why the conflict between the sectional agitations and Nigeria persist and such does not give way for gross national development.

Wherever conflict abides positive development is deterred and if not properly handled leads to destruction of lives and properties as can be noticed in the south-eastern region of Nigeria.

Sectional agitators (IPOB and MASSOB) conflict with the Nigerian government over her refusal to address the Biafran issue and call for a referendum. They believe that the social, political, and economic structure of Nigeria does not favour the southeast and refusal to address the issue has led to call for secession.

II. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

During this research, there are various concepts that we shall be discussing as we review the works of others within this chapter. Concepts are terms that refer to the characteristics of events, situations, groups, and individuals that we are studying in social sciences [8]. Young (1975) defines concept as a shorthand representation of a variety of facts. Its purpose is to simplify thinking by subsuming several events under one general heading.

We shall define and review the following concepts sectional agitation.

- Self determination
- National development
- IPOB and MASSOB

2.1 SECTIONAL AGITATION

There is no universal accepted definition for the concept sectional agitation, still from the meaning of agitation we can attribute the meaning of sectional agitation. According to Klemes in [9] agitation is a component of the political leadership of society through the working-class party, focused on bringing the party's; message to the masses". Agitation transcends into a situation in which people protest or argue especially in public to achieve a particular type of change therefore sectional agitation refers to a situation in which a group of people related ethnically or politically protest or argue to achieve a change.

Effective political mass agitation is characterized by consistent party mildness, elevated ideas, closeness to life, persuasive reasoning, variety in the choice of means and clarity. The means of agitation include press, radio and television, oral agitation (individual conversation, discussions in small acres, lectures forums, etc) tracts, flyers, porters etc. IPOB and MASSOB been halved in various protests across the southeast/south region in agitation for self-determination.

2.2 SELF DETERMINATION

Self-determination is the process by which a country determines its own statehood and forms its own government. [10] defines self-determination as "the process by which a group of people, usually possessing a certain degree of national consciousness, from their own state and choose their own government."

United Nations Charter (1970) states "by virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the charter of the United Nations, all people have the right freely to determine without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development and every state has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the charter".

The United Nations charter clarifies two meaning of the term self-determination. First, a state is said to have the right of self-determination in the sense of having the right to choose freely its political, economic, social and cultural systems. Second, the right to self-determination is defined as the right of people to constitute itself in a state or otherwise freely determine the form of its association with an existing state. Both meaning have their basis in the charter (Article, paragraph 2 and article 55 paragraph 1). IPOB and MASSOB while agitating for self-determination have always made a reference to the [11] as part of the basis that justifies their call for a Sovereign State of Biafra.

2.3 NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The concept National Development is very encompassing as it includes all spheres of the life of or individual and the Nation.

Braddell (2014) defines ‘National Development as the ability of a country or countries to improve the social welfare of the people, for example, by providing social amenities like good education, infrastructure, medical care and social services.’

[12] has this to say, “the foundation of National Development is development especially development in social, political, economic, emotional, linguistic and cultural fields”.

National Development occurs when forces and factors endeavour to provide a unity in the integration of national actions and challenges which encourages the people to meet their aspirations and goals related to their social and personal benefits which willingly or unknowingly geared to the national progress. Barriers in National Development include factors that hinder the development of a nation. Some of these barriers include the educational disparities, racism, economic differences, religious fanaticism, and sectional agitations. Sectional agitations for self-determination by IPOB and MASSOB have some negative impacts on the nation’s development as shall see in this chapter.

2.4 IPOB (INDIGENOUS PEOPLE OF BIAFRA)

It is a separatist organization led by Nnamdi Kanu. The group wants a number of states in southeast Nigeria, made up mainly of people from the Igbo ethnic group, to break away from Nigeria and form the independence nation of Biafra (wikipedia.org).

IPOB was formed years ago by Nnamdi Kanu it was envisioned as a radical separatist group that would quickly deliver the republic of Biafra to the Igbos through secession.

IPOB has a powerful radio that broadcasts the speeches of its founder, Nnamdi Kanu, a dual citizen of Nigeria and Britain. In October 2015, officers of the department of State Security Nigeria secret security police, arrested Kanu at Golden Tulip Hotel, Lagos and took him into detention in Kuje, Abuja. He was charged for treason along with other brethren. He was later granted bail after been detained without rail for more than a year –and-a half despite various court orders that ruled for his release.

In May 2017, IPOB demonstrated that it enjoyed huge loyalty in the southeast following a sit at home order it issued to Igbos in honour of those massacred in the Niger – Biafra civil war (1967-1970) the call was largely heeded in Abia, Anambra, Enugu, Rivers, and Imo States and Ebonyi as banks, markets, petrol stations schools etc were closed [13].

IPOB has sworn to continue to seek for independent state of Biafra until the Nigeria government conducts a referendum across southeast Nigeria to ascertain the masses choice on whether to remain as one Nigeria or become an independent state. Uwazuruike, with headquarters in Okigwe, in the Okigwe district of Imo State.

2.5 MASSOB

MASSOB’s leader says it is a peaceful group and advertise a 25-stage plan to achieve its goal peacefully. There are two arms to the government, the Biafra government in exile, and Biafra shadow government.

MASSOB agitates for a republic of Biafra which comprises of southeast and south-south Niger. The group philosophy is based and guided by the Mahatma Gandtu’s (1920) principles of nonviolence. Although MASSOB leader has stated in interviews that the Niger Delta can have their own republic should they want it.

MASSOB members embark on protests to protest arrests and killings of its members. In 2005, MASSOB reintroduced the old – Biafra currency into circulation. It as wall launched the Biafra passport in 2009 as part of the program to celebrate its lath anniversary. MASSOB leader was arrested in 2005 and later released in 2007

MASSOB has continued to seek for the independence of southeast and south-south Nigerian and challenges been faced.

According to [14] collectively security is guided by the fact that the fabric of human society has become so tightly woven that a breach anywhere threatens disintegration everywhere unchallenged aggression in one direction emboldens and helps to empower its perpetrators penetrate another region.

Also, the essential commitments of collective security system necessitate the willingness of nations to fight for the maintenance of the statuesque, even though this involves litany of innocent people and the squealing of valid objective sto the moral legitimacy established state of things.

In Nigeria, MASSOB IPOB has continued to mount pressure on the federal government for the southeast to rule herself through, self-determination. Many people and scholars have at one time had things to say regarding this case and its impact on the nation’s development

Ayo Adesopo Professor of Public Administration Obafemi Awolowo University (OAU) Ile-Ife maintained that the trend portends danger and advised the Nigeria government against it [15]. Adesopo cautioned that should the government welcome the agitation and allow it, other regions may start similar agitation to the extent that the government will have no choice but to comply and that may be the beginning of

disintegration of the giant of Africa called Nigeria. Adesopo stated that even if the government wants to entertain it, the processes to follow are so cumbersome that the country cannot handle it without degenerating into political upheaval. Osuji, (2017), a second republic politician maintained that any Igbo who has a contrary view on the agitation of the Biafra state is not a true Igbo man and his "Igboness" should be doubted. He added "our secession is long overdue because there is a thick conspiracy to drive us to extinction in this country".

Comrade Domion Ogudike (2017) Public Relations Officer of Congress of Civil Society Groups, Anambra State stated that the agitations of the South-South and South-East are enshrined in the constitution and the United Nations charter.

He stressed that there is a clause that indigenous people have the right to leave if they do not want to stay in their country and Nigeria is covered of the United Nation [15]. According to him, even the courts have declared the agitations as legal, adding that it is the duty of the government to conduct referendum to ascertain their opinions if not, the Nigeria nation state may remain in shambles. Alagoa et al. (2017) a Niger Delta rights activist, said that the quest by the Igbo or any other ethnic group in the country to secede is in consonance with the principles of self-determination.

He highlighted some of the factors that are responsible for the agitations for a break away to include lack of rule of law, unequal right, injustice, bad governance, and abuse of democratic norms [15]. Morris in Alagoa et al. (2017) said the Igbo should be allowed to separate from the country only after proper delineation of boundaries and the rights of others in an area, who would not want to support secession, had been guaranteed.

2.6 Impacts/consequences of sectional agitation by IPOB and MASSOB for self-determination on National Development can be seen as follows:

Firstly, because of the frequent demonstrations by Pro-Biafra activist and the clashes between them and disrupted in locations where these protests occur, although no study has put a figure on the extent of these economic disruptions, data derived from our survey indicate that 62.8 percent of the respondents believe that increasing agitation for Biafra disrupts economic activities they rank disruption of economic activities as the most serious consequence of renewed agitation for Biafra (see figure 1).

The tendency for Pro-Biafra protests to disrupt economic activities is understandable considering that most of the protests occurred in the major commercial areas of the southeast. The media analysis of Pro-Biafra protests indicates that 16 incidents involving Pro-Biafra separatists were reported in two National Dailies (the Sun Newspaper and Vanguard Newspaper) between 28 March 2014 and 14 June 2016 of these eight incidents occurred in Onitsha, while five took place in Aba, other cities in the south-East and South-South such as Asaba, Port Harcourt, Abakaliki, Enugu, Ikom and Yenagoa, recorded one to three incidents.

Related to the problem of disruption of economic activities is the issue of disengagement of investments in the southeast. As shown in figure 1, respondents to our survey ranked this problem as one of the first three consequences of the renewed agitation for Biafra. Since the last two decades, the southeast has been struggling with a declining economy. Poverty rate in the region has jumped from 34.2 percent in 2004 to 58.7 percent in 2010. While poverty rate in all regions of Nigeria has increased in the past two decades, the degree at which the number of poor in the southeast spiraled is indicative of the plunge in the region's economic prosperity. The decline in the economic fortune of the South-East reflects on the number of publicly quoted companies in the region, which is the least in Nigeria. With the absence of formal enterprises, the south east's economy is essentially informal, employing a smaller number of graduates than other regions. The informal nature of the South-East economy has a link with the Biafra war.

The war forced many formal businesses out of the zone and following the indigenization of many of these businesses and the transfer of their ownership to individuals from other parts of Nigeria, not many companies considered it expedient to return to the southeast. The economic depression of the late 1970s and 1980s stifled the remaining formal businesses and frustrated attempts by Igbo entrepreneurs to sustain formal businesses in the area. With increasing hostilities between Biafra separatists and Nigerian authorities, the investment climate in the southeast could be made more unfriendly, discouraging potential investors from directing their resources to the area.

2.7 Impact of renewed agitation for Biafra

What are the consequences of the renewed agitation for Biafra?

The third consequence of the recurring agitation for Biafra is its tendency to affect regional and national security. The increasing capacity of the radical separatists to mobilize potential protesters could fuel armed violence and worsen the existing levels of insecurity in the region.

Fourth includes dehumanization and denial of human rights of civilians and protesters. There is substantial evidence that the Nigerian authorities have used excessive force including killing incarceration and harassment to suppress the separatist group. In May 2008, MASSOB alleged that the authorities have killed 2,020 of its members since 1999. Recently [1] issued a report in which it provided details of how the Nigerian

security forces killed at least 40 unarmed people and injured more than 50 others, in an operation conducted between 29 and 30 May 2016 apparently to prevent a march by IPOB members ahead of Biafra commemoration events in Onitsha, Anambra State. Events such as the Onitsha killings raise serious questions about Nigeria's capacity to respect its international human rights commitments which require among other things, the protection of the right to peaceful assembly and association, the right of freedom of expression, as well as the requirement that law enforcement officials must, as far as possible, apply nonviolent means. The handling of the pro-Biafra movement, together with other cases of human rights violations by Nigerian security agencies, has severely tarnished Nigerian's human rights record.

Fifthly the intensification of the activities of radical separatist groups such as MASSOB and IPOB has cultural dimension which involves and increasing break down of existing forms of inter-generational relationship.

Sixth the recurring agitation for Biafra has serious implications for political stability and democratic consolidation. With the separatist agitations simmering in other parts of Nigeria, the persistence of the agitation for Biafra could become a rallying point for groups questioning the Nigerian project. Biafra separatism can produce a snowball effect motivating group after group to demand for greater autonomy or separation. This might create a basis for democratic breakdown. Furthermore, we shall be looking at various factors, causes and the impacts of sectional agitations by IPOB and MASSOB as highlighted as follows:

2.7.1 Ethnic Divisions and competition

Scholars of Nigerian politics have tended to focus on ethnicity and inter-ethnic competition for federal power to explain why agitation for Biafra tends to recur.

This perspective is best represented by [16] arguments that the current agitation for Biafra is led by the Igbo masses who feel disappointed by the failure of their elite to capture federal power. According to him, the current agitation for Biafra "represents a complete fracture between the Igbo elite and their masses" due to the inability of the former to capture the Nigerian presidency and suggest that "the fact of the matter is that the Igbo elite has a strong empirical basis to read Nigerian political history as one of failure and frustration for them. With this failure of the elite, the Igbo has seized the initiative of following the path of disintegration.

Both [17] and Owen (2016) present similar accounts of the recurrence of Biafra separatism, although they see the elite rather than the masses as the main drivers of the agitation. For Adetula the recent upsurge in Biafra separatism involves local elites negotiating for power – "many groups in the country have never felt represented by the central power. Local elites play on these emotions for their own personal gain. This is how local elites try to create greater political space for themselves". Similarly [18] claims that the recent agitations for Biafra represented "a bid for re-inclusion by political actors excluded from power". He believes that the recent surge in Biafra separatism is engineered by the political elite in response to the significant realignment of power at the federal level following the defeat of President Goodluck Jonathan of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) whom the southeast offered vast support. The change of government according to him, has relegated many career politicians from the region from juicy federal positions in Abuja, making them susceptible to use instability as a form of political leverage and channel of engagement with the federal government. While it is possible that some political actors see in the call for self-determination a route to political inclusion in the aftermath of the defeat of President Jonathan, these arguments cannot explain the widespread call for self-determination under Jonathan administration, as well as their systematic repression.

[19] offers a constructivist version of the ethnic competition argument, linking the re-emergence of Biafra separatism to the interaction between history, institution, and political actors. His fundamental contention is that although Nigeria is democratizing, and country's political institutions have remained largely authoritarian, constraining political actors, but at the same time, offering them incentives to mobilize along ethnic, as opposed to civic lines. The actors, according to him, are forced underground into armed dissent because of obstacles to their ethnic project and their inability to utilize civic strategies to build a winning electoral coalition due to election rigging by the dominant ruling elite.

2.7.2 Economic frustration

A second set of arguments for the persistence in sectional agitation (southeast) for self-determination focuses on the effects of economic frustration or absence of it on separatist feelings. It sees the current call for self-determination as a struggle by young people expressing resentment over their material condition – a condition which they face because of broader contradictions of the Nigerian political economy, but which they perceive as ethnic exclusion. The main argument of this perspective is that Biafra separatism is a political expression of economic frustrations of young people.

These frustrations are, however, perceived by these agitators as resulting from the marginalization of the southeast in national economic life. Contracting economic opportunities in the region, which has seen a very

high level of unemployment even among highly educated young people, account for the proneness of the area to separatist agitations and insecurity.

This is deepened by a perception that other parts of the country are unduly privileged by the federal government. It is widely acknowledged that groups are more likely to rebel when they feel disadvantaged vis-à-vis other groups in the society, on the other hand, studies point to insecurity as a major disincentive to the development of the previously buoyant regional economy, this creating a vicious circle of insecurity and under development.

2.7.3 State – Society Relations

The third explanation for the persistence of Biafra separatists (IPOB and MASSOB) agitation links it to the nature of state-society relations in Nigeria. Studies by [20] and [21] represent this perspective. [20] attributes the re-emergence of Biafra separatists' movement to state violence – defined as “any act by the state or its agents that causes physical or mental injury against the person or property of its law – abiding citizen or group of citizens”. According to him, the absence of state violence in the immediate post – civil war era and its rise following the violence military coup of 1976 explain the decline and resurgence of Biafra agitation in the post-war period.

[21] on the other hand, attributes the re-emergence of Biafra separatism to the opening of Nigeria's political space following the country's transition to democracy in 1999. He posits that since 1999, Nigeria's political space has been diversified following the entrance of new non-state actors, such as ethno-nationalist movements, into that space. According to him, the post – 1999 political space is characterized by “confrontation between state – led nationalism and state – seeking nationalism and state – seeking nationalism (led by non – state actors). “In the contest, the state seeking nationalists appear to be losing out to the hegemonic state led nationalist project, prompting a change of strategy by ethno-nationalist groups and intensification of the demands for alternative spaces and parallel structure of power, the result of this development increase in separatist agitation.

2.8 Gap in existing statement of Problems

While existing explanations/statement of problems for the recurring agitation for Biafra are not necessarily wrong, they are limited in three important ways.

Firstly by placing overwhelming emphasis on the period since 1999, they present an incomplete picture of Biafra separatism which neglects the link between the current agitation for Biafra and the previous experiences dating to colonial times.

Secondly, the ethnic competition arguments are overly elite – driven neglecting the perspectives and autonomous action of the masses. In addition, it poses Biafra separatism in highly static terms, failing to account for variation in the intensity of the agitation overtime and factors that could lead to spikes and fall in the intensity of the agitation. Moreover, the idea of ethnic mobilization and manipulation does not account for several occasions the Biafra agitation was stoutly opposed by the Igbo elite, particularly under President Jonathan, who is now ironically posed as a symbol of the Biafra struggle.

Thirdly, as much as the “economic frustration” explanation of Biafra separatism appears interesting, its claims are not necessarily supported by empirical data. Although, in some respects, the development record of the southeast region is worse than it was in the previous decades, yet numerous studies have shown that the region performs at par with, or even better than, many other regions of Nigeria in key areas of development such as education, health, job creation, provision of infrastructure and poverty reduction. Recent examination of Nigeria's fiscal allocation record shows that five states of the region received far more revenue from the federation account than they contributed in 2014. Notwithstanding the existence of these facts a deep sense of marginalization continues to exist in the region. The issues, therefore, may not really be about the actual material condition of life in the region, but about the peoples' perception of these conditions and their expectations from Nigeria state.

Finally, there is no doubt that the factors suggested by existing writings on Biafra are at one time or the other present in the separatist agitations, still we do not know why and how they result in organized agitations in the form of MASSOB and IPOB.

2.9 Collective victimization and separatist feelings

Feelings of collective victimization among groups in Nigeria have to be understood in the context of broader characteristics of the Nigerian state, particularly its tendency to be contested at the margins. The Nigerian state has had a history of being contested at the margins. This is not unconnected to its construction by colonialism as a state to be guaranteed by ethno elite pacts. Since these pacts are inherently unstable, the Nigerian state has frequently experienced conflicts fueled by communal feelings like ethnicity, communal claims to natural resources, such as petroleum and religion.

Several years of military dictatorship strengthened the state as a centralized entity, with huge financial resources from export of petroleum controlled by the central government principally undergirding this strength. However, petroleum resources have had a dual albeit contradictory effect on the Nigerian state. They have on the one hand focused the interest of the elite on controlling the state and huge resources it offers, thus intensifying conflicts. But on the other hand petroleum resources have made elite pacts more feasible and the central state, therefore more viable. Consequently, the Nigerian state exists as a precarious balance between a relatively viable central state, which is guaranteed largely by slush petroleum money, and fragmentation at the margins fueled by deepening feelings of exclusion on both class and communal grounds. Earnings from export of petroleum have created a dual economy that sustains exclusion and therefore fragmentation at the margins. One part of this economy is a booming petrol-economy that underwrites “big government”, big government contracts, a huge imports sector and a big service sector, while the other part is a backward economy still dominated by peasant agriculture and a large informal sector. The links between these two economics are very tenuous.

Nearly two decades of uninterrupted electoral government have provided a measure of stability in state institutions, but have also exposed the weaknesses of elections as elite pacts in a country deeply fragmented along communal lines. Since political parties tends to be organized along the contours of communalism, each election inevitably produces outcomes that “exclude” some sections of the elite, who purport to represent ethnic, religious and other communal groups, thus aggravating these contests at the margins. Political mobilization along communal lines, especially during elections, tends to revive longstanding feelings of inequities thus fueling aggressive demands for more favourable inclusion in power and resource distribution. These could range from localized conflicts over natural resources (Herders-farmers conflicts) to separatists agitations (Biafra) and insurgences (Boko Haram and Niger Delta). These contestations, rooted in feelings of exclusion and collective victimization, test not only the legitimacy of the state, but also its capacity to impose order thus necessitating even further elite stability pacts.

Separatist’s agitation may be conceptualized as interactions between inclusion and collective victimization (Table 1). From the table, our proposition is that during periods when there is a high feeling of collective victimization and low sense of inclusion, separatist agitation tends to be very high. Conversely periods of high sense of inclusion and low feelings of collective victimization see the lowest levels of separatist agitations. What we call critical moments (CM) constitute the nodal points for understanding this constantly swinging balance between inclusion and victimization represented in table 1. CM could be social events or actions of “historic” individuals or groups. What marks out CM in separatists agitations is their capacity to mobilize or be mobilized into feelings of collective group victimization, notwithstanding that they may affect only a very limited number of members of the group. Critical moments become emblematic of the individual experiences of members of the groups and their high resonance enhances their mobilization value.

Table II.1: Matrix of victimization and inclusion

	High	Low
HIGH	High separatist agitation	Very low separatist agitation
LOW	Very high separatist agitation	Low separatist agitation

Election stands out among critical moments in separatist agitations, especially in a state dominant ethnically divided country like Nigeria because they congeal all the hopes and fears of groups that perceive themselves as collectively victimized. Other critical moments would include recurrent events in which members of a group suffer personal lows or death, even if isolated with developments in communication, CM are more rampant and more capable of leading to separatist mobilization.

We should also make a distinction between “Push separatism” and “Pull separatism”. The former is associated with a feeling of not being wanted while the latter is associated with a feeling of being different. The desire for exit in the two are therefore different, while push separatism is driven by a feeling of necessity, pull separatism is driven by a feeling of freedom. While the former is “expellant” in nature, the later is “propellant”. In other words, push separatism arises from a sense of being expelled, while pull separatism arises from internal propulsion to leave. As such, push separatism is highest in situations of high feelings of collective victim hood and each critical moment confirms the perception of being unwanted.

Secondary evidence, which indicate that feelings of collective victimization are critical in the Biafra separatist agitations, are abound in the literature. In the following sections, we present evidence, which connects recurring separatist agitation to the Biafra war of 1967-1970, especially to the following:

- 1 The grievances that led to the outbreak of the war.
- 2 Grievance arising from how post-war settlement.

- 3 Grievance emanating from how post-war settlement was implemented. That body of evidence strongly suggest that development that occurred before, during and after the Biafra war engendered particularly deep grievance which have created a sense of collective communal suffering and collective victim hood among the Igbo three major factors have helped to sustain and reinforce this sense of victim hood, namely:
 - a. Certain policies and actions of the Nigerian government which are perceived to disadvantage the group.
 - b. Acts of violence seen to be targeting the group.
 - c. The rhetoric of the Igbo elites as well as those of other Nigerians.

The Igbo frame their victim hood around direct and indirect experiences of perceived victimization and sustain this posture through their personal and group repertoire. A distinguished author of Igbo origin, Chinua Achebe (1983) identifies shared resentment of Igbo by other Nigerian as the basis of the feeling of collective victim hood among the group he claimed that:

Nigerians of all ethnic groups will probably achieve consensus on no other matter than their common resentment of the Igbo...modern Nigerian history has been marked by sporadic eruptions of anti-Igbo feeling of serious import, but it was not until 1966-7 when it swept through Northern Nigeria like “a flood of deadly hate” that the Igbo first questioned the concept of Nigeria” [22].

Various presentations and publications by the Igbo elite offer the impression that “the Igbo is fundamentally rejected as a group – a group which in consequence, rejected Nigeria itself”. They identify acts of victimization against the Igbo to include physical harm, economic disempowerment, and political marginalization. These acts of victimization have spanned three main historical periods – before, during and after the Biafra war.

2.10 Response to Perceived Victimization

Historically, the Igbo have adopted two broad responses to the perceived victimization of the group the first responses can be described as mainstream inclusivism, while the other can be referred to as radical separatism.

2.10.1 Mainstream-Inclusivism

Mainstream – inclusivism represents the attitude of the Igbo people who see greater political, economic and social inclusion of the group as the most effective way of addressing the groups victimization Ohaneze-Ndi-Igbo(2016) offers the most rounded conceptualization of this approach by framing its core guiding principle towards an approach which underscores the need for dialogue at appropriate times, the be silent rather than unduly vocal and provocative, as well as the need to cultivate friendship instead of enmity.

Since the 1970s, the Igbo elite have used organizations such as the Ohaneze-Ndi-Igbo to push for greater inclusion in Nigeria’s socio-political and economic life in framing the Igbo agenda, Ohaneze Ndi-Igbo has prioritized equality of states in all zones and creation of additional state for south east zone, the issue of “true federalism” as a national stabilizing factor, the question of power shift with emphasis on the election of a Nigerian president of Igbo extraction and economic development of the south east zone. The organization has identified several strategies required to mainstream the Igbo agenda in contemporary Nigerian politics. The strategies include:

- a. Reinventing the pre-civil war Igbo spirit and values, especially the spirit of genuine national reconciliation based on the Igbo idea of Egbebelu Ugobelu (or justice for all).
- b. Encouraging the emergence of good leaders and quality leadership.
- c. Promoting positive attitude to money, including rejection of all forms of abuse of money.
- d. Cultivating good manners, respect for ourselves and others, decency and better human relations.
- e. Rigorous application for the Igbo concept of Ako and uche.
- f. Placing emphasis on the principle of justice for all in the relationship between Ndigbo and other Nigerians
- g. The use of deeper, subtle, and more actuate political sense.

Besides cultural organization such as the Igbo central union and Ohaneze-Ndi-Igbo, several Igbo personalities have been staunch advocates of mainstream-inclusivism. One of those figures is the former president of Nigeria, Nnamdi Azikiwe. Azikiwe was clearly – mindedly opposed to ethnic separatism and violence as means of addressing Igbo victimization. In 1949, at the heat of his opposition to Igbo victimization, [23] counselled the Igbo to asset their right to self-determination, but to do so “as a unit of a prospective federal commonwealth of Nigeria and the Cameroon’s”, along with other nationalities asserting their right to self-determination “each as separate as the fingers, but united with other as a part of the same hand.

2.10.2 Radical-Separatism

Radical separatism contests the inclusivism response, whether as strong or loose integration. They hold that a sovereign, independent state of Biafra is the only solution to the victimization of the Igbos. The inclination of the Igbo towards separatism draws from a widely held notion among Nigerians, especially in the pre-war period, that secession is a legitimate and necessary response to perceived acts of injustice or fear of ethno-regional domination. [24] aptly demonstrated in his 1970 article that the belief in the legitimacy of secession has deep roots in Nigerian political thought. Many groups in Nigeria have expressed separatist thought/viewpoints at various stages of the country's political development. However, one of the ironies of Nigerian political history, as [25] observed, is that it was the easterners who had given secession the least consideration in the past that eventually put the idea into practice and have championed it till today.

Radical separatist thinking was decisive in shaping the support for Biafra secession by various sections of the Igbo society. [25] argued that in embracing the idea of a separate Biafra states, leaders of the eastern region were convinced that:

1. The security of their lives and property could not be maintained if they were subject to the control of the Nigerian government as their constituted.
2. Orderly processes of negotiation aimed at the reestablishment of a workable pattern of political relationships between the eastern region and the rest of the country has been effectively frustrated by the central government and could not fruitfully be resumed.
3. Secession was widely recognized throughout Nigeria as a politically legitimate step, and would be acquiesced in, if not actually supported and/or imitated, by the rest of Nigeria.
4. The move to independence has overwhelming popular support in the eastern region. Nixon (1972).

Of the four points outlined above, the first – threat to security of lives and property of the people of eastern region is obviously the core and the most enduring. Ethnic relations experts believe that acts of interethnic violence serve as “a very important agency of socialization into the ethnic scheme of things”. Such acts of violence, more than any other factor, leaves behind the longest lasting bitter memories of interethnic relations, successive acts of violence against the Igbo built on each other to heighten the feeling of ethnic exclusiveness, insecurity and hostility. It is then not surprising that insecurity of lives and property of the people of eastern region is the strongest argument for secession by Biafra supporters. In the 1960s, the claim was made by Biafra supporters that “the essence of government is for the good of the governed”. As long as the government fulfills its duties it can lay claim to the loyalty of the governed. But when the government forsakes its duties, it's also forfeits its claim to the people's loyalty. Biafrans have established a new government which they have empowered to protect them against all aggressors”.

The present-day-radical-separatists have restated the above argument to justify the current agitation for separation. On 22 May, 2000, the Movement for Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) hoisted to green-red-black flag of the deficit Republic of Biafra at the commercial city of Aba to symbolize the commencement of its struggle for a separate Biafra state. In a statement at the occasion, MASSOB leader, Ralph Uwazurike [26] explained the basis of their struggle as follows:

“As you may remember, about 30 years ago, there arose the need to save our people from total annihilation that attempt could not materialize, rather we lost over one million of our people, in the process. Today, we are yet faced with a similar situation. The unprovoked and organized killings of our people in Nigeria have remained unabated”.

The current situation and that of 1967 may not be similar as Uwazurike claimed, especially in terms of the scope and spread of violent attacks against the Igbo. However, the continuous threat to security of lives and property of Igbo evokes the same feelings of victim hood and political extremism that existed in the past.

While pre-war and post-war-radical separatists are united by their response to the question of the security of lives and property of the Igbo, the two groups differ in terms of the level of elite buy in to their struggle, the use of government resources to advance their cause, and the role of Igbo Diaspora in their struggles. Radical separatists thinking in the pre-war period was championed by crime de la crime of the Igbo society. The calls for secession of the eastern region in 1964 and 1965 were made by the premier of the eastern region and a member of the Federal House of Representatives respectively. The secession of 1967 was, according to Gown “planned and executed by the elite comprising some ex-politicians, university intellectuals, senior civil servants and I regret to say military officers”.

Billy Dudley (1973) agrees with Gowon maintaining that there was a consensus among the academic, the educated elite, and the governmental leaders, specifically the Igbo leaders in government”, in favour of a bid for secession. The elite makeup of the pre-war radical-separatists stands in stark contrast to the composition of the post-war radical-separatists who are drawn largely from the middle and lower classes –mostly young people who were radicalized by a sense of victimization relating to disadvantages in their professions and trades,

inability to find employment, and other forms of discrimination which they interpret to be the result of their ethnic identity.

The second major difference between pre-war and post war radical-separatists relates to the extent to which government resources were used in advancing the idea at any particular time. The fact that the key advocates of radical-separatism in the pre-war period were governmental leaders enabled them to utilize government resources to pursue their agenda.

The non-involvement of governmental leaders in post-war radical-separatists struggle makes it hard to mobilize using government structures and machinery. Because of the non-involvement of the Igbo elite in post-war separatist movement and the inability of the movement to use government resources in their struggles, there is an increasing tendency for the post-war-radical-separatists to antagonize the Igbo elites for failing to use the resources at their disposal to either stand up against Igbo victimizes or alleviate suffering of the Igbo population.

III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter is a description of the methods that was used in the collection and analysis of data. It discussed the research design, area of the study, population of the study, sample size, sampling techniques, sources of data, instrument of data collection, validation collection, validation and reliability of research instrument and method of data analysis.

Methodology is a set of methods used area of activity. In this study, therefore it is a scheme that serves as a useful guide to the researcher in his efforts to generate data for this study. The generation of useful data for a research work of this nature has to do with the selection of the best avenue, among available options to solve a research problem most efficaciously.

3.1 Research Design

This research adopted the survey research method. The rationale for adopting the survey method was that it helped to elicit responses from the sample respondents, (1975) cited in Okoro (200/p. 37), states that survey research is a very vital method structured for collecting data for the purpose of describing a population too large to be observed directly, through a careful sampling and good construction of a standardized questionnaire. It becomes possible together data from a group of respondents whose characteristics may be taken as being representative of those large populations.

This method was considered appropriate for this study since it provided all demographic information and options from respondents on the topic that was investigated.

$$1 + 40,000.000 (0.05)^2$$
$$N = \frac{40,000,000}{1 + 40,000,000 \times 0.0025}$$
$$N = \frac{40,000.000}{1 + 40,001,000 \times 0.0025}$$
$$N = \frac{40,000,000}{100.000}$$
$$N = 400$$

Sample size = 400

400 questionnaires provided out of which 80 questionnaires were distributed to each location namely Abia, Anambra, Enugu, Imo and Ebonyi states.

3.2 Instrument for Data Collection

This survey was conducted based on a combination of methods of data collection.

First data were derived from opinion survey of 400 respondents purposively selected to reflect the various sections of the society such as Biafra supporters, community leaders, community members and professionals.

Secondly, interview was the third method of data collection ten key information including former Biafra soldiers, supporters, academics, and security agents and media practitioners were interviewed using a predetermined interview schedule.

The study derived data from content analysis of media reports, involved scrutinizing reports of these daily newspapers (the Sun, Vanguard, and Guardian) for the period January 2010 to June 2017 in order to draw out relevant information.

3.3 Sources of Data Collection

In carrying out this research, the data of the study was obtained from media reports, documentary sources, and opinion survey using a questionnaire, interview primary and secondary data formed the basis of data collection for analysis. The primary source of data was based on administration of pretested interviewer questionnaire while the secondary data included media reports, documentary sources.

3.4 Validation of Instrument

To ensure the validity of the research instrument, the researcher content validity in which the questionnaire was drafted to reflect they variables understudy. The questionnaire was also evaluated and approved by my supervisor after diligent examination of the validity of the questionnaire by critically examining through the instrument to point out the statements that are poorly worded and those that do not correspond with objectives of the study.

3.5 Tests for Reliability of Instrument

The reliability of the instrument was confirmed by pre-test method in which 10 copies of the questionnaire were distributed to a trial group to ascertain the degree of reliabilities of the instrument and the process repeated one week later (few adjustments were made, and the questionnaire certified reliable). Responses were then scaled and compared for consistency and adjustment made which considered the questionnaire reliable.

3.6 Method of Data Analysis

To analyze the raw data, simple percentages and tables were used necessary. The percentage method was adopted for presentation of data that was analysed with regards to its efficiency wide use and ease of understanding. The study hypotheses were tested using Chi-square test stated as:

$$x^2 = \sum \frac{(O_i - E_i)^2}{E_i}$$

$$x^2 = \text{Chi - square}$$

$$O_i = \text{observed frequency}$$

$$E_i = \text{expected frequency}$$

$$\text{Level of significance} = 0.05$$

$$\text{Degree of freedom} = df$$

IV. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Data Presentation

This chapter presents and analyses the data collected by the researcher in the cause of this study. It shows the computation and analysis of data using tables, frequency and simple percentages. A total of 400 copies of the questionnaires were administered for this study. Out of the 400 copies of the questionnaires were administered for this study. Out of 400 copies distributed, 395 were returned and only 390 copies were filled in correctly and valid for data computation.

4.1.1 Section One (1)

Socio demographic of respondents

$$\text{Percentag} = \frac{X}{X} \times 100\%$$

$$X = \text{specific number of respondents}$$

$$X = \text{total number of respondents}$$

Table IV.1: Sex of respondents

SEX	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Male	180	46.2
Female	210	53.8
Total	390	100

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 4.1 shows that out of 390 respondents, 180 (46.2) were male and 210 (53.8) were female.

Table IV.2: Marital status of respondents

MARITAL STATUS	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Single	80	20.5
Married	210	30.8
Divorced	40	10.2
Widow(er)	150	38.5
Total	390	100

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 4.2 shows that 80 (20.5%) respondents are single, 120 (30.8%) are married, 40 (10.2%) are divorced and 150 (38.5%) are widow(er)s.

Table IV.3: Occupation of respondents

OCCUPATION	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Student	45	11.5
Civil servant	89	22.8
Academic staff	67	17.2
Non-academic staff	101	25.9
Others	88	22.7
Total	390	100

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 4.3 shows that 45 (11.5%) respondents are students, 89 (22.8%) are civil servants, 67 (17.2%) are academic staffs, 101 (25.9%) are non-academic staff, 88 (22.7%) have other occupations.

Table IV.4: Occupation of respondents

EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATION	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
PHD	40	10.3
MSC	59	15.1
BSC/HND	197	50.5
OND	40	10.3
WAEC/NECO	54	13.8
Total	390	100

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 4.4 shows that 40 (19.3%) persons are PHD holders, while 59 (15.1%) possess MSC, 197 (50.5%) are BSC/HND holders 40 (10.3%) have OND and 54 (13.8) posses WASC/NECO.

Table IV.5: Age range of respondents

AGE RANGE	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
18 – 22	50	12.8
23 – 29	44	11.3
30 – 36	40	10.3
37 – 43	42	10.7
44 – 50	65	16.6
51 – 57	80	20.5
58 and above	69	17.7
Total	390	100

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table IV.6: Tribe of respondents

TRIBE	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Hausa	80	20.5
Igbo	135	34.6
Yoruba	70	17.9
Tiv	30	7.7
Idoma	20	5.1
Others	55	14.1
Total	390	100

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 4.6 indicates that Igbos have the highest responses with 135 (34.6) respondents and Idomas are the lowest with 20 (5.1%) respondents out of 390 respondents.

Table IV.7: State of residence of respondents

STATE OF RESIDENCE	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Abia	98	25.1
Anambra	123	31.5
Enugu	50	12.8
Imo	84	21.5
Ebonyi	35	9
Total	390	100

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 4.7 shows that the highest number of respondents resides in Anambra State with a record of 123 (31.5%) while the least is Ebonyi State with a record of 35 (9%).

Presentation and analysis of research questions to examine the impacts of sectional agitations for self-determination on National Development by IPOB and MASSOB of south-eastern Nigeria.

Reasons for sectional agitations for self determination in southeast Nigeria.

Question 1: Do you agree that sectional agitations by IPOB and MASSOB is in consonance with the principles of self determination?

Table IV.8

RANGE	# OF RESPONDENT	PERCENTAGE
Yes	335	85.9
No	55	14.1
Total	390	100

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 4.8 shows that 333 (85.9%) respondents agree that sectional agitations by IPOB and MASSOB is in consonance with the principles of self-determinations while 55 (14.1%) do not agree.

Question 2: which of the following is/are responsible for sectional agitations for a breakaway southeast Nigeria?

Table IV.9

OPINION	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Lack of rule of law	55	14.1
Unequal right	31	7.8
Injustice	20	5.1
Bad governance	92	23.6
Ethnic division and competition	54	13.8
Economic frustrations	89	22.8
Total	390	100

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 4.9 shows that 55 persons (14.1%) believe that lack of rules of law is responsible for sectional agitation for breakaway, 31 persons (7.8%) agree its unequal rights, 20 persons (3.1%) persons agree its injustice, 92 persons (23.6%) agree it's bad governance, 103 persons (26.4%) agree its ethnic divisions and competition while 89 persons (22.8%) agree its economic frustration.

Question 3: Do you agree that indigenous people have the right to secede, if they no longer want to stay in their country?

Table IV.10

OPTION	# of RESPONDENT	PERCENTAGE
Yes	347	88.9
No	43	11.0
Total	390	100

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 4.10 indicate that greater number of respondents 347 (88.9%) agree that indigenous people have the right to secession, should they no longer want to be part of their country.

Question 4: Do you think the Igbos should be allowed to separate screed from the country?

Table IV.11

OPTION	# OF RESPONDENT	PERCENTAGE
Yes	33.1	82.3
No	69	17.6
Total	390	100

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 4.11 indicates that greater percentage of respondents think Igbos should be allowed to secede/separate from the country.

Question 5: Are IPOB and MASSOB the only agitations for self-determination in south-east Nigeria?

Table IV.12

OPTION	# OF RESPONDENT	PERCENTAGE
Yes	282	72.6
No	107	27.4
Total	390	100

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 4.12 indicate that 283 respondents (72.6%) agree that IPOB and MASSOB are the only agitators of self-determination while 107 (27.4%) do not agree.

Impacts of sectional agitations for self determination

Question 6: Do you think there are negative effects of sectional agitation by IPOB and MASSOB on National Development?

Table IV.13

OPTION	NO OF RESPONDENT	PERCENTAGE
Yes	212	54.4
No	178	45.6
Total	390	100

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 4.13 shows that 212 respondents (54.4%) think there are negative effects of sectional agitation by IPOB and MASSOB on National Development while 178 respondents (45.6%) respondents disagree.

Question 7: Do you agree that the trends of sectional agitation portend danger to Nigeria's economy and political stability?

Table IV.14

OPTION	# OF RESPONDENT	PERCENTAGE
Yes	294	75.4
No	96	24.6
Total	390	100

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 4.14 show that greater percentage 75.4 (294) respondents agree that the trends of sectional agitation portend danger to Nigeria's economy and political stability while 96 (24.6%) disagree.

Question 8: Do you agree that Nigeria government should be advised against welcoming the agitation?

Table IV.15

OPTION	# OF RESPONDENT	PERCENTAGE
Yes	131	33.6
No	259	66.4
Total	390	100

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 4.15 shows that 259 (66.4%) respondents disagree that Nigeria government should be advised against welcoming the agitation while 131 (33.6%) persons agree.

Question 9: Ethnic divisions, economic frustration and political instability are impacts of sectional agitation on national development.

Table IV.16

OPTION	# OF RESPONDENT	PERCENTAGE
Yes	380	97.4
No	10	2.7
Total	390	100

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 4.16 shows that out of 390 respondents, 380 (97.4%) agree that ethnic divisions, economic frustration, and political instability are impacts of sectional agitation on national development while 10 respondents (2.7%) do not agree to that.

Elements driving the call for self-determination.

Question 10: Which of these groups are the driving forces for self-determination?

- (a) The elites (b) the masses (c) IPOB and MASSOB

Table IV.17

OPTION	NO OF RESPONDENT	PERCENTAGE
The elites	40	10.3
The masses	167	42.8
IPOB and MASSOB	183	46.9
Total	390	100

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 4.17 shows that IPOB and MASSOB are the highest driving force for self-determination with 183 respondents indicating to that followed by the masses with 167 respondents indicating that the elites with 40 respondents indicating that.

Measures that help to curb agitation in southeast Nigeria.

Question 11: Which of the following strategies are required to curb agitation in southeast Nigeria?

Table IV.18

OPTION	NO OF RESPONDENT	PERCENTAGE
Appointment of Igbos into sensitive position	40	10.3
Address the issue of marginalization	55	14.1
FG should conduct a referendum for the southeast	73	18.7
Implement the recommendations of 2015 national conference	47	12.1

Adopt a confederacy so all regions be independent	40	10.3
Allow Biafra to be independent	65	16.7
Articulate positive policies and actions towards the development of southeast	49	12.6
Application of military force	21	5.9
Total	390	100

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Table 4.18 above indicates that 40 respondents (10.3%) agree that appointment of Igbos into sensitive positions can curb the agitations, 55 respondents (14.1%) believe it's to address the issues of marginalization, 73 respondents (18.7%) believe it's for FG to conduct a referendum for the south east, 47 respondents (12.1%) agree it's the implementation of recommendations of 2015 Nigeria national conference, 40 respondents (10.3%) believe is for the FG to adopt a confederal system of government, 65 respondents (19.7%) agree it's to let Biafra to be independent, 49 respondents (12.6%) believe it's for FG to articulate positive policies and actions towards the development of south east while 21 respondents (5.9%) believe it's for FG to apply military force to curb the agitation in south east Nigeria.

4.2 Test of Hypothesis

The hypotheses are put forward to give direction to this research work. Chi-square (χ^2) statistical test was employed to test the hypotheses.

- HO:** Sectional agitation for self-determination by IPOB and MASSOB is not justifiable
HI: Sectional agitation for self-determination by IPOB and MASSOB is justifiable.

Using question 1

Do you agree that agitation by IPOB and MASSOB is in consonance with the principles of self-determination?

OPTION	NO OF RESPONDENT	PERCENTAGE
Yes	335	85.9
No	55	14.1
Total	390	100

Source: Field Survey, 2018

$$\chi^2 = \sum \frac{(O_i - E_i)^2}{E_i}$$

$$\chi^2 = \text{Chi - square}$$

O_i = observed frequency, E_i = expected frequency

RANGE	O_i	E_i	$O_i - E_i$	$(O_i - E_i)^2$	$\frac{(O_i - E_i)^2}{E_i}$
Yes	335	195	140	19600	100.5
No	44	195	-140	19600	100.5
Total	390				201

The level of significance is 0.05 $\chi^2_{cal} = 201$

$$\chi^2_{cal} = 201$$

Degree of freedom = $(G - 1)(R - 1)$ $G =$ column total

$$= (2 - 1)(2 - 1) = R - \text{Row total}$$

$$= 1 \times 1$$

$$df = 1$$

$$x^2_{tab} = 3.84, x^2_{cal} = 201$$

Decision Rule

If chi-square calculated is greater than the chi-square tabulated values, reject the Null Hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis.

From out table:

$$x^2_{cal} = 201$$

$$x^2_{tab} = 3.84$$

Therefore, the calculated value ($x^2_{cal} = 201$) is greater than the tabulated ($x^2_{tab} = 3.84$). Thus, we reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis.

Interpretation of Result

The result above indicates that sectional agitation for self-determination by IPOB and MASSOB is justifiable.

Hypothesis Two

HO: There is no association between sectional agitation by IPOB and MASSOB and national development.

H2: There is an association between sectional agitation by IPOB and MASSOB and national development.

Using Question

Do you think there are negative effects of sectional agitation by IPOB and MASSOB on national development?

OPTION	NO OF RESPONDENT	PERCENTAGE
Yes	212	54.4
No	178	45.6
Total	390	100

Source: Field Survey, 2018

$$x^2 = \sum \frac{(O_i - E_i)^2}{E_i}$$

$$x^2 = \text{Chi - square}$$

O_i = observed frequency; E_i = expected frequency

RANGE	O _i	E _i	O _i - E _i	(O _i - E _i) ²	(O _i - E _i) ² / E _i
Yes	212	195	17	289	1.48
No	178	195	-17	289	1.48
Total	390				201

The level of significance is 0.05 $x^2_{cal} = 201$

$$x^2_{cal} = 201$$

Degree of freedom = (G - 1) (R-1) G = column total

$$= (2 - 1) (2 - 1) = R_{\tau} \text{ Row total}$$

$$= 1 \times 1$$

$$df = 1$$

$$x^2_{tab} = 3.84, \quad x^2_{cal} = 201$$

Decision Rule

If chi-square calculated is greater than the chi-square tabulated values, reject the Null Hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis. Vice versa

From our table:

$$x^2_{cal} = 2.96$$

$$x^2_{tab} = 3.84$$

Therefore, the calculated value ($x^2_{cal} = 2.96$) is less than the tabulated ($x^2_{tab} = 3.84$). Thus, we accept the null hypothesis and reject the alternative hypothesis.

Interpretation of Result

The result above indicates that there is no association between sectional agitation by IPOB and MASSOB and national development.

Hypothesis Three

HO: IPOB and MASSOB are not the only driving the call for self-determination in southeast Nigeria.

H3: IPOB and MASSOB are the only driving the call for self-determination in southeast Nigeria.

OPTION	# OF RESPONDENT	PERCENTAGE
Yes	283	72.6
No	107	27.4
Total	390	100

Source: Field Survey, 2018

$$x^2 = \sum \frac{(O_i - E_i)^2}{E_i}$$

$x^2 = Chi - square$

$O_i = observed\ frequency; E_i = expected\ frequency$

RANGE	O _i	E _i	O _i - E _i	(O _i - E _i) ²	(O _i - E _i) ² / E _i
Yes	283	195	88	7744	39.7
No	107	195	-88	7744	39.7
Total	390				201

The level of significance is 0.05 $x^2_{cal} = 79.4$

$$x^2_{cal} = 201$$

Degree of freedom = (G - 1) (R-1) G = column total

$$= (2 - 1) (2 - 1) = R - \tau\ Row\ total$$

$$= 1 \times 1$$

$$df = 1$$

$$x^2_{tab} = 3.84, x^2_{cal} = 79.4$$

Decision Rule

If chi-square calculated is greater than the chi-square tabulated values, reject the Null Hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis. Vice versa

From our table:

$$x^2_{cal} = 79.4$$

$$x^2_{tab} = 3.84$$

Therefore, the calculated value ($\chi^2_{cal} = 79.4$) is less than the tabulated ($\chi^2_{tab} = 3.84$). Thus, we reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis.

Interpretation of Result

The result above indicates that IPOB and MASSOB are the only elements driving the call for self-determination in south-east Nigeria.

V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary of Findings

During this research, the researcher was exposed to some facts in trying to know the causes and impact of sectional agitations by IPOB and MASSOB for self-determination on National Development. A summary of the findings include:

Critical Moments – Critical moments consist of periods when there is a high feeling of collective victimization among the Igbos and low sense of inclusion into economic/political matters within the state.

From my findings, when there is high feeling of victimization and low sense of inclusion, separatist agitations tend to be very high. Conversely, periods of high sense of inclusion and low feelings of collective victimization sees the lowest levels of separatist agitations.

This is evident as we observed that when the Buhari government came into power on May 29, 2015 and made a reshuffle later on in ministerial appointments excluding Igbos in key government offices and his speech on giving only 5% of government's attention to the region that did not support him in elections (obviously referring to the southeast) gave rise to sudden radical agitations by IPOB. Most south easterners protested that as it was the principle of a democratic state.

Critical moments have a defining influence on separation feelings. To a large extent, the sense of collective victimhood which underlies separatist feelings is reinforced by critical moment. Policy makers should set up mechanisms for proper monitoring of critical moment through an effective early warning system. Another finding includes push separatism.

Push separatism is associated with a feeling of not being wanted in a society. Push separatism arises from a feeling/sense of being expelled. Push separatism is highest in situations of high feelings of collective victimhood.

What distinguishes the struggle for self-determination by IPOB and MASSOB from struggles against the Nigerian state is the tendency of Biafra supporters to pose their agitation as a response to the rejection by Nigeria. Biafra supporter's interpreter many of the critical moments as indicators of the tendency among other Nigerians to reject the people of southeast.

To address this kind of sentiment, a well thought out national reconciliation programme needs to be established. The purpose of the programme would be to heal the wounds of the past and bring back all those who feel a sense of rejection in the Nigerian state.

5.1.1 Human Rights Violation

There is substantial evidence that the Nigeria authorities have employed force in attempt to suppress the agitations by IPOB and MASSOB. These include killings, incarceration, and harassments. In May 2008, MASSOB alleged that the Nigerian authorities have killed 2,020 of its members since 1999.

Recently amnesty international issued a report in which it provides details of how the Nigerian security forces killed at least 40 unarmed people and injured more than 50 others in an operation conducted between 29 and 30 May in Onitsha. Such awful scenarios raise serious questions about Nigeria's capacity to respect its international human rights commitment.

Any effort to address the renewed agitation for self-determination may not be totally effective unless violations of the rights of Biafra supporters are controlled and put human rights violations investigated and addressed.

The handling of the pro-Biafra movement together with other case of human right violations by Nigerian security agencies has severely tarnished Nigeria's human rights record.

5.1.2 Inter-generational Relations

The widening intergenerational differences in southeast Nigeria and its potential for further fragment the society call for concern. The breakdown of intergenerational relations holds serious consequences for social cohesion, peace building and development. The government and other actors can respond to this development by undertaking serious confidence building measures such as regular interaction and dialogue between leaders of the southeast states and the people particularly the youths.

5.1.3 Economic frustration

Frustration arising from blocked economic opportunities both within and outside the southeast are part of the critical elements underlying the deep sense of collective victim hood and separatist feeling among the people of the region. Addressing the renew agitation for Biafra entails development of well-thought-out economic revitalization programme involving the government as well as the private sector.

5.2 Conclusion

Sectional agitations for self-determination in southeast Nigeria is a phenomenon that virtually shook this country Nigeria down to its foundation. For this reason, the researcher decided to study the “Impact of Sectional Agitations for Self-determination on National Development: A study of IPOB and MASSOB of South-eastern Nigeria.

From the foregoing discussions, it is evident that agitations for self-determination have impacted negatively on Nigeria’s National Development and as such has no association with Nigeria’s national development positively.

The researcher sought for the justification of IPOB and MASSOB’s agitation for self-determination to a sovereign state of Biafra and from the test conducted it shows that sectional agitations for self-determination by IPOB and MASSOB id justifiable implying that their course is a just one and so should be looked into properly.

5.3 Recommendations

Having examined and tested the objective and hypotheses findings of this study, the researcher therefore recommends that:

- 1 The Nigerian government should establish on independent commission of inquiry to conduct a transparent, comprehensive, and impartial investigation into alleged unlawful killings and other human right abuses of Biafra supporters. The commission should include, among others, representatives of the pro-Biafra groups such as MASSOB and IPOB, international and national human rights groups, and the UN Special Reporter on extrajudicial killings the instigation should focus on:
 - Identification of all those that were allegedly killed or abused and the circumstances under which their human rights were violated and
 - Identification of those that were directly involved in the killings and abuses and the circumstance under which the alleged violations of human right were carried out.
- 2 The Nigerian government should prosecute without delay and in accordance with international fair trial standards all those implicated in the killing and abuse of Biafra supporters.
- 3 The Nigerian government should conduct quick, open and fair trial of Biafra agitators in detention.
- 4 The Nigerian government should set up a light full peace and reconciliation commission to engage with pro-Biafra groups with a view to devising an effective approach to the resolution of the agitation for self-determination by IPOB and MASSOB.
- 5 The Nigerian government should reduce its threats of use of force against IPOB and MASSOB, apply force with utmost restraint and only extreme situations, and prosecute violent protesters according to the due process of law.
- 6 The governments and leaders of the five south east states should establish an economic revitalization scheme that would complement the interventions by the federal government s and other stakeholders.
- 7 Nigeria’s development pertness should issue public and private statements denouncing excessive use of force against and human rights abuses of pro-Biafra supporters and call on the Nigeria government to hold abusive security agents accountable.
- 8 Nigeria’s development partner should provide targeted funding and technical assistance to support initiatives aimed at improving the economic conditions in the southeast and addressing the grievances of IPOB and MASSOB.

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