



Research Paper

Media Globalization: Examining the Convergence of Corporate, Political, And Media Interest

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ABSTRACT: There is growing concern about media globalization and the resulting growth of vast global media corporations. This study focused on the phenomenon of media globalization and examined the convergence of corporate, political, and media variables in the global media regime. The study adopted historical and documentary research design, leveraging on review of empirical studies and a variety of theories that address multinational corporations with media properties. Some scholars and observers argue for and against deregulation of media markets. Those for herald deregulatory trends as expanding information choices and enabling citizens to find their preferred levels of political engagement. Thus, the study revealed that, from all indications, deregulatory pressures from media globalization regime have undermined public service broadcasting and media social-responsibility norms, resulting in deterioration of information quality and political disengagement of citizens in many nations. Media corporations who have stood out as global giants take the advantage to introduce media imperialism. The study, having acknowledged that, the media globalization regime should naturally avoid several conceptual pitfalls bothering on media and democracy, recommended that, the agency of citizens must be included in any analytical framework on the quality of public information flows, global and national. Not only do citizens-as-audiences create demand for particular types of content, but, increasingly, with the proliferation of new media such as the Internet, citizens have unprecedented capacities to produce and distribute their own information to large and influential audiences both within and across national boundaries

KEYWORDS: Media, convergence, media globalization, media markets, media corporations, citizens-as-audiences.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The study focussed on examining the degree to which global and political interests have besmirched global media businesses and the professional values of media practitioners. From a conventional standpoint, Media in today's history, has been shaped by a revolution in globalization, democratization and even technologically. On this basis, commercialized media would have been impossible to encourage and support consumer markets and worth, globally. However, these arguments can be based on the assumptions that corruption by public officials and past authoritarian administration has had the potential to undermine the notion that leaders are capable of ruling with impunity. The primary vehicle of the phenomenon of global media is the multinational corporation. Media globalization has aided in both the production and distribution of information. [1] has noted that the production rate of information doubles every eight years. In addition, "information is being produced at a rate that is four times faster than the consumption of information" [1]. The phenomenon of media globalization along with the increasing abundance of media-text production has produced various effects which are being researched by communication scholars. Media globalization is a broad topic, which includes television, radio, film, music, the Internet, and other forms of digital media.

Christopher Dixon, a media analyst for Paine-Webber has stated that a creation of a "global oligopoly" is taking place among a handful of multinational organizations which control worldwide media properties. [2]. [3] identified a short list of nine global media corporations, which represent a variety of nations, as the major players [3]. These corporations and their significance will be discussed in more detail in this paper. Media globalization shall be defined as the phenomenon of expanding multinational corporate media investment, resulting in the emergence of a global oligarchy of first tier corporations, which own and operate a variety of mass media content and distribution technologies including: television, radio, film, music, broadcasting,

satellite, telecommunication, cable, newspapers, magazines, publishing companies, Internet content providers, and other forms of converged digital media. [1]

Globalization is being driven by increasingly strong international market factors fuelled by organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The World Trade Organization was established in 1995 and as of October 2004 had 148 member nations. The WTO is located in Geneva, Switzerland. According to the WTO, they are "the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations" [4]. The International Monetary Fund was founded in 1945 and is located in Washington D.C... The IMF currently has 184 member nations. The goals of the IMF include: monitoring and consultation, financial assistance, and technical assistance to its members [5]. Other organizations which promote globalization are: the World Bank (1946) which makes loans to developing nations, and the Trilateral Commission (1973) which focuses on trade between Japan, Europe and North America, "to foster closer cooperation among these core democratic industrialized areas of the world with shared leadership responsibilities in the wider international system"[6].

The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is another significant player regarding globalization policies and discourse. UNESCO was founded in 1945 and is headquartered in Paris, France. As an agency of the United Nations, UNESCO functions as an international cultural think tank, which "serves as a clearinghouse – for the dissemination and sharing of information" to its 190 member nations in the areas of "education, science, culture and communication." One of the ambitious goals of UNESCO is to "to build peace in the minds of men" [7].

Thus, this study focussed on the examination of the convergence of varied interest and the cultural effects of media globalization, and then discuss various communication theories that address issues emanating from media globalization.

II. MATERIALS AND METHODS

The study employed historical and documentary research design. Qualitative analysis was carried out, and was aided by review of available literature, and desktop analysis. Theories of media globalization were also reviewed to give underpinning and anchorage to the study.

III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

Theoretical Underpinning

Before examining the nature of the global media system, there is a need to examine some underlying theories of global media. The origin of the 'critical political economy' theory can be traced to the criticisms raised in communications theory in the 1960s, which disagrees with the futile approaches employed, in delivering value and as well, highlighting the significance of the ideology of power; especially as it relates to the political and economic interaction with culture. With regards to critical political economy, media establishments are dominated and limited to the circulation of ideas and opinions of economic structures which encourages diverse hegemonic ideologies amongst a wider populace [8].

[9] opines that data in the development of a political economy is intertwined with communications. At the heart of the political economy of communication is 'propaganda', particularly political propaganda [10]. Due to the capacity of media to be used for propaganda purposes, there is the danger that in the hands of a few, media can be manipulated for selfish purposes. Nazi propaganda during the rise of Hitler serves to buttress this particular position.

The critique of mass communications theory is closely associated with the Marxist critique of capitalism, which linked this critique of media in liberal-democratic societies to a broader conceptual understanding of the bases of social order in class-divided social structures. The theory of critical political economy highlights how media reinforces the social divide. Bearing in mind the purported relationship between media and capitalism, critical political economists are concerned about the potential for media to be driven by corporate and government interests rather than the interests of the wider public. The danger from such a situation is that cultural transformation risks being the reserve of the upper class in society rather than a broad-based consensus. In fact, [11] assert that: "Dominant economic interests strongly influence, if not necessarily determine the range and diversity of textual forms available to audiences for interpretation, and there are structurally together with rhetorical restrictions to polysemy of media content".

On the overall, for critical political economists, the main source of worry is a situation where economic and media/cultural spheres increasingly overlap. In the propaganda model of the media, [12] identify five filters which are: ownership, funding, flak, sourcing and fear. From the perspective of funding, newspapers may marginalize news that conflict with the buying mood of their readers in a bid to secure advertising income [12]. The critical political economy theory will be very instrumental to this essay and will form the basis for some of the other issues that will be discussed here.

In another vein, [13], identify another theory that enhances the understanding of global media. This theory is 'cultural studies', which have been particularly associated with cultural power through which media is widely distributed globally. Cultural studies is not really a theory in itself, rather it is regarded as an interdisciplinary framework [8]. There is a political economy of the media developed according to Hall's postulations of cultural studies through the 'encoding and decoding model'. [8] opines that: "The process of encoding of media texts incorporates the institutional structures of media, organizational cultures and production practices, relations of production, and technical infrastructure, through which a media form, such as a newspaper or a TV programme is created..."

Based on [8] observation, the media is a veritable tool for driving culture, both at the national and international landscape. Despite the fact that cultural studies and critical political economy share a conceptualization of social reality obtained from critical theory, the underlying difference between both perspectives lies in the philosophy, and the economic and cultural development, expressed and the accepted achievements in modern societies[8]. To further explain the basis for cultural studies, [14] creates the concept of hegemony as one that was at the core of cultural studies as an interdisciplinary and politically engaged field of intellectual practice. [14] asserts that: "The concept of hegemony suggests that ideology and culture cannot be thought of as a 'superstructure' that is largely formed through developments at the level of the economic base...there can be no straightforward relationship of determination between the economic and the cultural".

Put differently, the cultural studies framework does not see any relationship between economic factors and cultural factors as critical political economy does. Media plays a considerable part in the processes of globalization. Media corporations are at the fore when it comes to corporations who are globalizing their operations. Media corporations are important parts of the globalization process especially considering that they are largely responsible for developing the global communications infrastructure that supports global information flows and transnational commercial activities [15]. To add to this, [8] asserts that: "Global commercial media are also central to the sale of products and services through their growing role in advertising and promotion..."

It is this area of global media culture that has been a major source of worry for critical theorist, who have stressed that propaganda can be effectively used in corporate global media to influence the transmission of information, most especially for political and personal interest [16]. One way of observing the way that media seeks to protect corporate interests is by observing the way media (television and newspapers) has reported on the protests, especially the Occupy London protest movements. Based on reporting standards, it is so disheartening to see that less concern has been shown by the media about the issues raised by the protesters, rather, more attention seems to be placed on the inconvenience caused by the protesters camped in St. Paul's Cathedral. This is made more obvious by the fact that the news agencies seem to be less concerned about reporting on the continued rise in executive pays and bonuses-one of the issues highlighted by the protesters. From the perspective of propaganda filters, this is 'funding'. Regarding the Occupy London protests, one may be tempted to conclude that the media has engaged in a systematic criminalization of protesters especially as their concerns seem to have been subjugated by the need to protect capitalist or corporate interests[17].

Judging from a critical political economy perspective, economic considerations seem to have influenced the content of news these days. Perhaps, the suspicion that news agencies, such as newspapers, are careful about giving further ground to arguments against increased executive pay seem to be as a result of the need to protect subscriptions and advertising income especially as some of these executives work in corporations that carry out advertising in such newspapers. Consequently, it is only fair to acknowledge that corporate interests have corrupted the content of reporting by media agencies. The protection of corporate interests by global media is not the only issue; in fact, there seems to be suspicion that news agencies are used by politicians and government officials as means of protecting sectional political interests, that is, the nature of foreign policy.

State theory has been a critical ground for debates between liberal-pluralist and critical theories of global media. There has been in recent times a considerable rethinking of how to comprehend state agencies in relation to global media, influenced by institutionalist theories and cultural policy studies. [18] opines that: "The political economy method challenged claims emerging from liberal-pluralist theory that the state was a neutral arbiter of conflicting interests, instead stressing the power and influence of corporate interests over government or public policy".

Another major concern of critical media theories is the tendency towards the concentration and effect, which media ownership and globalization ruled by foreign conglomerates have on the society and culture.[16] notes that communication, information and entertainment industries had realised economic superiority; based on cultural and global capitalism resorting into cultural imperialism. However, western ideologies have influenced and applied supremacy over the people. [19] further states the degree to which cultural flows are controlled by media giants who depend on strategic communication tools to disseminate their message. A typical example is the case of the dominance of Rupert Murdoch's powerful News Corporation around the globe, especially in the USA and the UK. Following the phone hacking scandals in the UK, revelations have begun to emerge of the

scale of corruption involved in the relationship between politicians in Whitehall and executives of News Corporation, the umbrella corporation of influential and popular tabloids such as 'The Sun' and the defunct 'News of the World'. It appears that politicians in the UK were careful not to offend members of the Murdoch family, through policy or otherwise, especially bearing in mind the enormous media power wielded by Murdoch in the UK. Perhaps, if the phone hacking scandal had not come to light, there is the possibility that Rupert Murdoch would have succeeded in his desire to acquire majority ownership of Sky International [20]. At this juncture, it is imperative to state that the use of phone hacking as means of securing saleable news was an integral policy of News International, especially as journalists seemed to be under undue pressure to generate news items that would increase the saleability of the widely read and now defunct newspaper, 'News of the World'.

Globalization is usually viewed as a process with a significant force, broadly varying and integrating societies and cultures into a unified 'Global Village'. This process can be likened to an unavoidable result of human and technological advancement[21] However, [22] asserts that human preferences emanates from global media conglomerates, therefore, it does not have to be a natural advancement resorting from the interaction and general association of cultures globally (e.g. ITU) which have interests in development. [22] opines that globalization is more pervasive at the media industry levels. The globalization of the media can be said to have been responsible for the gradual westernization of many societies. Media globalization makes it possible to infiltrate national cultures. Consequently, global media forces rival competitors to react to them. An instance of this was the launch of Murdoch's Star TV in India; the state television had to restructure and produce more attractive programmes as it was at risk of losing its audience [23].

While globalization of media may represent a form of cultural imperialism [22] especially as cultural homogeneity is constantly under threat, it is equally important to point out that global media has increasingly contributed to the construction of identities. Regarding this observation, [24] states that collective identity is seemingly becoming the focus of human science, which implies that collective identity might gradually fade with time; as individuals will discover their identities in the pre-established orthodox structures. [25]opines that as media globalization gathers pace; class, gender and ethnicity, there will be a drastic reduction in expression and social importance.

Global media has a huge role to play in conflict resolution especially from a foreign policy standpoint. Scholars, such as [26], have thoroughly researched on foreign issues such as terrorism and war. Researchers, nevertheless, are yet to examine the importance of the media in foreign policy and diplomacy. Foreign policy and media studies are both dispersed and diverse. [26] asserts that one relatively current theory referred to as 'CNN effect' asserts that in crisis situations, broadcast media functions as a dominating force or player in creating and achieving international reaction and foreign policy.

However, there is broad agreement that the broadcast media, has positively changed foreign policy, one pertinent question ponders on media's role as a neutral controlling force or manipulative instrument of the government.[26] Particularly, this issue draws the thin sensitive line between media neutrality and entrenched political interests. In fact, [27]states the role global communication plays as it restricts legislators, whilst at the same time offering them opportunities to promote their objectives. The restrictions and the opportunities are apparent at the level of foreign policy-making, which combines and facilitates considerable changes in the disposition of top officials and in most cases, journalists [26]. The 'CNN Effect' theory, originates from the post-cold war global conflicts [27] amongst which were the coverage of the students' protest in Beijing's Tiananmen Square by the Chinese government in 1989 and the coverage of the Persian Gulf crisis between 1990 and 1991, following the eventual invasion of Kuwait by Iraq.

According to [28] numerous scholars have cited and researched the effect of 'the CNN effect', confirming the validity of the results on the variables that yielded the most effective decisions in support to the CNN Effect theory. [28] notes that further evidence from policy makers indicate that humanitarian intervention in countries such as Rwanda, Chechnya, Somalia and Iraq have largely been driven by media interest and coverage. In fact, [29] opines that the broadcast of conflicts have created a potent reason for timely action, which never used to be evident. From a critical political economy standpoint, the aforementioned observations serve as indication of the closing gap in the relationship between the media and political interests.

The fact that global media has been shown to be a key driver of foreign policy serves as an evidence of the potential for global media to be used as a tool for propaganda by politicians in the West to propagate conflict. For instance, the criminalization of the Libyan regime by Western television media following the Arab Spring seems to have influenced the decision of the UK and French government to engage in armed intervention in such a region. Perhaps, there is the likelihood that extended and often lopsided coverage of protests in Libya could have been used as a tool by politicians in the UK to engage in armed intervention in Libya especially bearing in mind the need to secure energy interests. One must not forget the nature of coverage of non-existent 'Weapons of Mass Destruction' (WMD) in Iraq by global news agencies prior to the invasion of Iraq. According to [30], "the bulk of media coverage in the lead-up to the Iraq war largely accepted the administration's case for

war, often citing unconfirmed reports about the existence of WMDs in Iraq”. Events after the invasion of Iraq by the West have only created an air of credulity about the media. The Iraq and Libya case serves as indication of how entrenched political interests can corrupt news coverage by media corporations.

Media Globalization Regime

Analysis of media globalization is centred on identification of factors that shape competition over the key norms of the globalized media, such as those affecting ownership, content production and distribution, and social responsibility. Notable amongst these factors are as follows;

- ❖ Multinational conglomerates and national media corporations that strive for advancement of commercial norms, by way of concentrating on ownership of production and distribution, dominating advertising markets, and placing profit considerations above social responsibility.
- ❖ International and national political institutions where media businesses project their commercial norms, and which also provide the main grounds for contesting them.
- ❖ Domestic publics within nations, both consumers of media content and citizens challenging that content.
- ❖ Digital media (like Internet and Web) channels with global reach that are only partially integrated into commercial systems, which enable the distribution of political alternatives to commercialized content and the organization of grassroots protests against the media globalization regime.

Media Globalization and Corporate Interest

It is founded on fact that, If norms promoting neoliberal media deregulatory policies were not so popular, media giants would be less muscular, and surely less free to produce programming with so little public accountability[31]. This implies that the size of corporations may be less important to understand than the normative environments in which they operate and the quality of public information produced within those environments. Again, it is easy to see why discussions of the global media gravitate toward the breath-taking growth and shrinking number of corporations, along with the imitative predatory behaviours of second-tier national giants.

At the time, around 2010, the global media market was dominated by as few as seven giant corporations that have grown at astonishing speed into vertically and horizontally integrated, such as Disney, (AOL) Time Warner, Sony, News Corporation, Viacom, Vivendi Universal, and Bertelsmann [16]. Some observers argue that the quest for dominance is, in itself, a political problem worth worrying about. For instance, [16] proposes a simple model of corporate media behaviour as imperialistic, involving these elements: the race to conquer new territories (markets); the escape from national regulations and identifications that enables corporations to become semiautonomous world powers; and the quest for size or scale, which aims at depriving markets of alternative sources of products. Although this seems a good account of corporate motives, even as the moguls themselves discuss about them, but there are a several problems with focusing more on imperialistic motives than on the conflicts over regime norms that determine how those motives work, in practice, in different national contexts. Next comes the argument that although the global giants may be carving up the European and North American markets, these are merely two (albeit important) regions in the larger world picture. As noted above, other national and regional media systems (e.g., China, Islamic states, Russia, and cultural regions such as Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia) produce content that is culturally and, to varying degrees, politically apart from the neoliberal Western media regime. Some of these cultural flows even reach larger world audiences. Low-cost transmission and reception technologies enable programming to flow outward from Asian, Latin American, and Middle Eastern producers to audiences in regional neighborhoods, as well as to large immigrant communities in Europe and North America [32].

The Political Context of Media Globalization

Another element of transnational media has to do with the national and international political arenas in which the normative agendas of media companies experience political support and opposition. These diverse political grounds ranging from legislative, regulatory, judicial, to trade organizations may produce what appears to be a chaotic array of unique results, but their outputs can be understood as more general results of coalitions and policy networks struggling for or against the normative proposition of enabling media corporations to communicate their chosen content within and across borders. For instance, when viewed solely as national cases, many countries appear unique. However, the globalization would lead us to expect national variation in media ownership and political content to be a function of differential national engagement with the norms, corporations, and policy institutions of media globalization.

From what is obvious, the Italian case is often reduced to the particularity of Silvio Berlusconi's media empire and his influence in Italian politics[33]. Yet Berlusconi has acted in a manner which was somehow in accordance with the corporate norms even to the extent that his domestic political influence raised charges of corruption. Moreover, Berlusconi also acted in accordance with the aspiration to “go transnational,” as

evidenced by his ill-fated early entry into the French market in the 1980s and his more successful later ventures. The civic impact of his Italian activities began with the sweeping commercialization of Italian television and culminated in aligning the political content of TV news with the new populist politics of Berlusconi's own party [33]. [34] asserts that television has now taken over the role of parties in mobilizing a populist, right wing electoral response in Italy.

While Italy may be a somewhat extreme case because of the dissolution of barriers between the corporate media and the state, other nations display their own distinctive domestic mechanisms that define their engagement with media globalization. Another classical example is that, Japan was a late entrant in media regime politics. Various pressures combined to relax restrictions on concentration of media ownership, leading to the proliferation of channels and a diversification in news and entertainment content. Only some of the change can be attributed to external pressures to open the market to outside competition from BBC, CNN, and Murdoch. Decisive domestic initiatives also arose from government policy circles and national electronics companies that saw the closed market as stifling Japan's development of new communications technologies (Hanson 1997). Once again, the domestic politics that motivated Japan to join the regime may seem unique, but once it joined, the result was a characteristic mix of mergers, joint ventures, and the influence of external content formats, particularly in the area of news.

Many critics are of the view that the flow of commercialized news images standardizes political content on terms cued by Western governments and authorities. This may be true. At the same time, there is strong evidence that the pre-regime Japanese press system was hardly a model of quality, diversity, or autonomy from government news management [35]. Indeed, many observers have argued that deregulation has brought an overall improvement in the diversity and quality of news and public affairs programming on Japanese television[36][37][38]. A similar argument seems to apply to Mexico based on findings that private television introduced less partisan bias in coverage of the 2000 state elections than state television, which suffered continuing corruption from the parties in power[39]. These cases suggest that some national media systems may gain in civic information quality from joining the regime, while others may lose.

Cultural receptivity

Cultural receptivity is also an important factor in understanding media globalization at the national level. For instance, some nations that are open to market and content deregulation may exhibit consumer tastes that weave poorly with the generic product models of global media corporations. [16]asserts that this often results in multinational corporations simply buying national assets or signing distribution deals that give them some control over local content production. This was the model that Sony applied in Brazil. At the same time, such arrangements facilitate the export of Brazilian music to global audiences, which is hard to find overly objectionable.

Cultural barriers account for uneven engagement with the media globalization push in other national media markets as well. As reviewed, the deregulation of a rather dismal Indian state television monopoly in the 1980s produced a flowering of channels and outlets for a thriving internal (Bollywood) film and television industry [40]. Indian domestic interests and political cultures have been less resistant to the domination of Indian national news by global generic content providers such as WTN, Reuters, and APTV, whose feeds appear in local programs and echo through imports from Murdoch (Sky News), BBC, and CNN [40].

The French's case also represents a variant of the interaction between domestic politics and culture and various arenas of media globalization contest. The case of France was characterized by domestic political receptivity in the form of a breakdown of a centre-right pro-regulatory consensus in the early 1980s. This receptivity was balanced by state-sanctioned cultural selectivity, a combination that accounts for French acceptance of some regime norms and fierce resistance to others [41]. The French case is also interesting because it enables us to see how national politics often crosses into international venues. France has long been a player in international arenas, from UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) initiatives for a New World Information and Communication Order in the 1970s to more recent WTO negotiations over cultural products.

It has equally been observed that, many nations engage international venues to reconcile internal and external deregulatory pressures against countervailing domestic pressures for the protection of local culture industries, the imposition of moral codes (including government and religious censorship), or the maintenance of public service broadcast or newspaper subsidies. Notable among the most interesting political stories in this space is the proliferation of international regulatory venues to accommodate this political bargaining [42]. Similarly, Sweden has become a leader in efforts to restrict WTO jurisdiction over cultural products. Shopping among international venues has also enabled Sweden to use its term as chair of the European Union in 2001 to initiate EU legislation modelled on Swedish regulations that protect children from advertising [16]. In such

instances, national engagement with international arenas suggest fierce struggles to define and delimit the impact of media globalization norms within nations.

Media Globalization and Media Interest

Even as many nations have resisted the full media globalization effects that have been visited upon the United States, it is possible to identify three general trends that occur to varying degrees in most nations that have engaged with the media globalization regime. These forces play out differently depending on the levels of national political resistance and the state's continuing public service commitment sustained after engagement with the media globalization front. The trends include: general de-politicization of commercial media content environments; more specific introductions of infotainment, tabloid, and anti-politics formulas in news content; and struggles in public service systems over audience declines and pressures to adopt less "highbrow" and more commercial content formulas[31]. Corroboratively, Adbusters, a North American consumer activist organization, tested the openness of publicly licensed commercial media space in the United States by trying to buy airtime to run a commercial promoting its campaign for an annual day of consumer freedom called "Buy Nothing Day." After years of trying, no media outlet would run the ad (except for CNN, which eventually capitulated). When corporate executives were challenged about their decisions to reject the paid, well-produced, humorous spot, their explanations were instructive. The Vice President of advertising standards at General Electric/NBC said, "We don't want to take any advertising that's inimical to our legitimate business interests." A Westinghouse Corp./CBS official went so far as to declare that Buy Nothing Day was "in opposition to the current economic policy in the United States" [43].

Similarly, [44] asserts that national politicians and broadcasters often become tacit partners in setting the communication tone for consumer societies. As broadcasters become active boosters for market values, "TV programming develops a new form of neutrality; its managers become co-administrators of the global culture of consumption..."[44]. Price also contends that the shift to consumerism as the core public value in many Western democracies is generally accompanied by a political consensus favouring neoliberal economic policies and related political discourses on the part of parties and other state actors. This consensus often includes labour and former left parties that compete for middle class votes by offering consumer-oriented tax and social policies. The rebranding of the political left, from the Clinton "new Democrats" to Third Way labour parties in Britain, Germany, and Sweden, typically weakens domestic opposition to consolidation in commercial media sectors. The result is that, with the important national variations noted above, commercial market formulas are allowed to drive program content, cultural offerings, and public affairs formats.

[44] concludes that this transformation of media content makes globalization at the national level "virtually synonymous with a tendency toward de-politicisation, part of an effort by the state to diminish the potency of the media to disturb the status quo." A prime indicator of this de-politicization of media content is the transformation of news. Mainstream journalism becomes a litmus test for the degree of elite neoliberal political consensus within nations; both because commercial news organizations favour centre-right policy discourse and because politicians (who are the prime news sources) operating within that discourse generate little news that falls outside of it.

The Drive and Convergence of Interests in Media Globalization Regime

One of the most general characteristics of media globalization is that news formats in more commercialized media systems tend to display a mix of infotainment (consumer trends, fashion, sports, celebrity gossip), sensationalism (sex, scandal, and violence), and political negativity (social and governmental dysfunction often emanating from politicians themselves and embellished by journalistic "discoveries" of scandal, waste, and excess)[31]. This "soft news" is cheap to produce, and it works reasonably well for the commercial purpose of grabbing audiences and delivering them to advertisers. Resultantly, the irony of these commercial news formulas in big actors like the United States may be an overall loss of audience due to sheer alienation of many citizens [45][31][46]. Nonetheless, information formats and audience engagement patterns do not always line up so neatly.

An obvious finding points out that tabloid and infotainment trends are stronger in more fully commercialized media systems. [47] did not find clear infotainment trends in his content analyses of news in northern European nations with strong public service traditions.[48] found that the presumed tabloid trend depended on deregulatory market factors within nations. The alluring conclusion is that the civic corrosiveness of the neoliberal media regime may be checked in nations that continue to support autonomous public service news organizations. But there are other problems in public service land, as [9] culled from research on ten nations, including cases from Eastern and Western Europe, Asia, and Latin America:

The empirical studies here revealed that, the stronger the dominance of the commercial broadcast media, the less the policy-relevant information content of television broadcast. Conversely, public sector broadcasting in all of the established democracies studied in this work here is characterized by more extensive

coverage of public affairs, the conveyance of a greater volume of policy-relevant information, and a more scrupulous respect for journalistic norms of impartiality toward parties, politicians, and politics in general. Unfortunately, following the deregulatory trends set in motion in the 1980s, as more and more commercial broadcasting channels have been established, the public-service ethic has been progressively weakened and citizens exposed to less policy-relevant information. Indeed, most of them can now avoid television coverage of politics altogether. Furthermore, even if infotainment has not become the norm in public service cultures, the loss of audiences creates, maybe, a larger problem for mediated civic engagement.

Strong commitments to politically independent public service broadcasting continue to distinguish many nations, particularly in northern Europe, Britain, and Scandinavia. These nations offer citizens distinct choices in political information, and they often enter international policy arenas to protect those options. The dilemma, however, is that even nations that uphold commitments to public service media have experienced audience erosion, a problem compounded by difficulties in finding attractive formats for presenting important democratic events such as elections [50]. Part of the problem may be that commercial competitors give citizens just enough information to satisfy minimal civic interests, while raising questions about why citizen tax or license monies should continue funding expensive public service operations when “free” news and entertainment abounds in the commercial sector.

[51] reports on a poll taken in Britain among readers of three different Murdoch papers, all of which had editorialized relentlessly against public broadcast subsidies as anticompetitive and wasteful. In the late 1980s, *The Times*, *Today*, and *The Sun* were positioned for three very different demographic markets; the upper, middle, and popular/working class, respectively. Surveys of the general population routinely found these three groups responding very differently on the question of support for public broadcasting subsidies, yet all three registered strong views against the license subsidy in the poll of the Murdoch media audience.

Another part of the audience erosion problem may be that even though public service and high-quality news organizations attempt to cover politics in depth, there is really not very much to report because of the shallowness of press-source interactions that are increasingly managed by communication professionals. Indeed, the movement toward a neoliberal consensus in the mainstream politics of many nations, when combined with the near-universal adoption of bloodless professional communication formulas, may have left the press with little chewy material to report even if they have the resources and space to do it [50]. Under such circumstances, in-depth political coverage may be more off-putting to audiences than the same events packaged as breezy infotainment fare.

Another challenging element is that, the same processes of globalization that have swept societies at high economic and social levels also affect the social identities of citizens in ways that radically transform their information habits. The challenge to both commercial and public service news organizations in societies with changing citizen identities is how to transmit information meaningfully to audiences that no longer resemble the relatively homogeneous national audiences of the mass society era. Citizens operating in more fragmented societies such as the United States appear to be seeking much more personalized relations to politics [52]. The result may be highly individualized information needs that mass communication news and public information models are poorly equipped to satisfy. This citizen identity shift makes media audiences within nation’s important players in the media regime, whether they are the less engaged citizen-consumers who favour lighter content or the more activist citizens who find even high-quality conventional news sources inadequate because they are aimed at an outdated model of citizenship.

IV. CONCLUSION

Although the globalization of media has been welcomed in many quarters especially with regard to the creation of identities, there remains a dark side to media globalization. Media globalization, when used as a propaganda tool by corporations, can place national cultures at risk. International corporations, have the potential to influence content put out by media organizations in many nations (mostly developing) especially as increased competition puts pressure on national media organizations to put out competitive and entertaining content. However, one alternative route to this issue is for global media businesses to re-order, delink their dependency and operations from one another. The real model of global media regime has been turned off to give way to imperialism. The global media regime model in itself was to naturally avoid several conceptual pitfalls concerning media and democracy. Perhaps the most important contribution of this model is the focus on the new communication technologies that commercial media seem least capable of controlling or rendering profitable. The rise of these new global communication channels holds the greatest promise for reconciling current tensions among markets, media, citizens, and democratic order. But today, the essence is defeated. The study recommended that, the agency of citizens must be included in any analytical framework on the quality of public information flows, global and national. Not only do citizens-as-audiences create demand for particular types of content, but, increasingly, with the proliferation of new media such as the Internet, citizens have unprecedented capacities to produce and distribute their own information to large and influential audiences both within and

across national boundaries. This is necessitated by the fact that, in recent years, citizen production capacity has resulted in direct challenges to the neoliberal economic regime in general and to the global media regime in particular.

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