



Research Paper

Impact Of Boko Haram Insurgency in the North East and On National Security

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ABSTRACT

This study examined the impact of Boko Haram insurgency in the North East and on national security. The Boko Haram menace has long been observed to impair the foresight of growth and economic development of the North-Eastern region and making the region to become an uneasy and un-habitable environment. With consistent violent attacks on security forces, civilians, churches, mosques, farms, media houses, schools as well as international bodies such as the United Nations in 2011, thus Nigeria an enormous degree of security threats and dilemma. The study was guided by four research objectives and four research questions. This study adopted the descriptive research survey design and the population of this study consisted of all security facilities and officers' residents from the three states in the North East. The simple random sampling technique was used to select the security personnel from each security outfit in each of the state under study and a sample size of 412 respondents was derived which was made up of 24 military officers within the ranks of commanders and 72 divisional police officers and 316 junior officers. The instrument for data collection was a self-constructed questionnaire titled "Impact Assessment of Boko Haram Insurgency on Security Facilities Questionnaire (IABISF) and the questionnaire was validated by two experts which were drawn from security units and one from peace and security studies department of the University of Ibadan. In order to determine the reliability of the instrument, a trail test was conducted and the internal consistency of the instrument was computed using Cronbach Alpha Method and a reliability coefficient of 0.93 was derived. The data collected from the respondents were collected and analyzed using descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) to answer the research questions. Findings from the study revealed that Boko Haram insurgency have damaged security facilities in the North-Eastern region to a high extent; further findings showed that the extent of destruction of security facilities in Yobe State is high; amongst others. The study recommended that it is essential for the government to take every step necessary to defeat and deter the growing threat of the Boko Haram insurgency in order to restore peace and in the region. The method to do this is to ensure proper coordination among the security agencies.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Recent discussions on Nigeria are not without the security and related problem conditions. The discussion borders on insecurity, militancy, insurgency and terrorism with devastating effects on social, political, economic and religion relations in Nigeria (Adewumi, 2014).

Since 1999, when Nigeria returned to democratic rule after decades of dictatorship, there has been an increase in violent activities in the country with Boko Haram insurgency being at the forefront. Today, the governance structure is being tested by Boko Haram sect that has become a threat to both internal and international security as their activities have now stretched beyond Nigeria to her neighbours. It has been observed over the years that the insurgency-related issue has claimed a lot of lives, particularly, in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria. This menace is long observed to have been impairing the foresight of growth and economic development of the region and making the North-Eastern Nigeria at large to become an uneasy and un-habitable environment. With consistent violent attacks on security forces, civilians, churches, mosques, farms, media houses, schools as well as international bodies such as the United Nations in 2011, thus Nigeria is faced with varied degree of security threats and dilemma.

The Boko Haram sect has made good of its threat as they took up arms against the government agencies in the Northern States namely Borno, Adamawa, Bauchi, Yobe among others. As the insurgent group grows stronger, the neutralization of the security forces and its facilities become their target with the aim to achieve strategic statement.

It is against this background that the study seeks to examine the impact of Boko Haram activities on security facilities in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States.

The study is very important because, as observed, most studies on Boko Haram centre on human security with little or no in-depth study on security facilities. Any study on Boko Haram activities without the impact on the security facilities would create incomplete analysis of the real impact of the dreaded group on the Nigerian state. Therefore, avoiding the gap in knowledge as noted in existing studies on the subject matter, underscores the relevance of the present study.

Statement of the Problem

The emergence of the Boko Haram insurgency in the North East Nigeria has created a security vacuum within the region. The threat constituted by the group in Nigeria, the neighbouring countries and the international community cannot be ignored. The group has engaged in guerrilla warfare against Nigerian government and its citizens since the last decade. Living conditions in the North East region have been degraded, life and properties have been destroyed and an increasing refugee crisis across the region calls for urgent action. Despite efforts by the Nigerian government and its partners to combat the Boko Haram insurgency, the group continues to pose a threat and challenge to Nigeria's government and its partners. The security situation in the North East region has deteriorated and the territorial integrity of Nigeria is being undermined.

This paper will try to gain an understanding of the concepts behind the Boko Haram insurgency in the region and how their activities have affected the security facilities in Nigeria.

Aim and Objectives of the Study

The aim of this study is to determine impact of Boko Haram insurgency in the North East and on national security. The specific objectives of the study will be to:

1. examine the impact of Boko Haram activities on security facility in North-Eastern region.
2. assess the extent of which the Boko Haram affects security facilities in North-Eastern region.
3. ascertain whether Boko Haram activities impact negatively on the security facilities in North-Eastern region.
4. identify measures adopted by the government to address the Boko Haram insurgency as it relates to damage done to security facilities in the affected states.

Research Questions

The following research questions guided the study

1. Does Boko Haram insurgency impact greatly on Nigerian security facilities in North-Eastern region?
2. To what extent, does the activity of the Boko Haram insurgency affect security facilities in the North-Eastern region?
3. Does the Boko Haram insurgency impact negatively on the security facilities in North-Eastern region?
4. What are the proactive measures taken by the security agencies in preventing Boko Haram attacks on government/security facilities in the region?

II. CONCEPTUAL REVIEW

Insurgency

Insurgents are a locally motivated group whose movement is primarily political, both the insurgent and government use armed force to pursue their political, economic and influence activities. While insurgency, may involve other actors with different interests, a single national group, as seen in the case of Boko Haram, ISIS, and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, does not always conduct it; they are loosely connected in dynamic and non-hierarchical networks. The insurgencies need a charismatic leadership, supporters and funding (mostly from illegal activities) in order to operate successfully. Depending on the situation, insurgent group may receive local or foreign support from state or non-state actors based on their interests. It is also important that the regime understands the insurgents' sources of inspiration, support and fundamental grievances in order to conduct a successful counter-insurgency operation (Thomas, 2009).

According to Dr. Thomas A. Marks, the works of Mao Tse-tung are un-avoidance in any discussion of insurgency. Hence, it is essential to understand Mao's approach to irregular warfare in order to gain advantage over insurgent groups such as ISIS, Boko Haram, or similar movements. Apparently, state actors need to study the characteristics and features of insurgents in order to defeat them. It would be wrong to focus only on the

military aspects of insurgencies. Mao's approach to guerrilla warfare indicates the fundamental goal of all insurgent movements is strategically political and directed operationally through multiple lines of struggle, only one of which was violence.

As insurgents grow stronger, the neutralization of the military becomes their objective with the aim to achieve strategic stalemate. However, he acknowledged that violence is critical to insurgencies, but it is not the most important element. The "cause" of the struggle is the most important element. Violence is an enabler for "the cause" to advance (Thomas, 2016).

Boko Haram

Oluwatosin (2016), in *Combating Extremism and Insurgency in Nigeria*, refers to the Boko Haram sect as the "most recent extremist group in Nigeria", which continues to commit a lot of violence atrocity against soft targets. Despite Nigerian government efforts to combat the sect, it continues to prove resistance as he claimed that the government lacked the solution in dealing with the challenge of violent extremism. Several attempts by extremist groups to forcefully impose religious ideology in Northern Nigeria seem to threaten the peaceful co-existence of the country, a country with diverse religious beliefs. The writer notes that the colonial legacy, among other factors such as socio-economic conditions, corruption and weak political institutions of government, contributed to the increase in violent extremism in the country, especially Northern Nigeria. However, he suggested the government should consider the use of military force as a last resort, after first exploring other traditional approaches to conflict resolution.

Muhammad (2015) described insurgencies as being "old as civilization but became most prominent after the September 11 attack on the World Trade Center in the United States by Al-Qaeda". He notes that the anti-Western ideology of Boko Haram has earned the group recognition and concern about its potential relationship with other terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Al-Shabab. Boko Haram, which started as a domestic sect in the Northeast Nigeria, has spread across the regions of the Chad Basin. Boko Haram activities have a negative impact on the economy of Nigeria like other terrorist activities across the globe. The continued attacks on government installations, organizations and bank robberies have chased away investors, both local and foreign. Additionally, military allocation has taken priority over other sectors of government, which is detrimental to national development and growth. Othman opts for a tough government approach in combating Boko Haram in order to create a conducive atmosphere for business activities, which directly improves the conditions of the people.

Adesoji, in *Muhammed (2015) the Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria*, notes "The Boko Haram uprising was not the first forceful attempt to impose a religious ideology on a secular Nigerian society". The recurrence of religious conflict was traced back to the Maitatsine sect in 1980s, an Islamic group that attempts to undermine the Nigerian state and forcefully introduced a religious ideology. Government crackdown on the groups resulted in widespread resistance by its members, which led to the death of scores and damage to properties in several Northern parts of the country.

However, the Boko Haram uprising was distinctive in that it not only set a pattern, but also reinforced Islamic conservative efforts to impose religious ideology throughout regions of Nigeria. She attributed the uprising of the Boko Haram insurgency to the religious sensitivity of Nigerians, the prevailing economic situation in the country, party politics, and inconsistency of some vocal Islamic leaders. The group is suspected to have been inspired by the Taliban of Afghanistan (Israel, 2016).

Israel (2016), who wrote *Domestic Terrorism and National Security in Nigeria*, emphasized, "Northern Nigeria has been a hotbed of religious uprising, most often between the dominant Muslims and minority Christians in the region. Islam has become heterogeneous with the springing up of many Islamic sects. These sects are opposed to the local Nigerian Islamic teachings of the Sufi Brotherhood and are gradually alienating themselves from the main Islamic body". The Maitatsine uprising of the 1980s was a good example of the emerging trend of domestic terrorism in Nigeria. However, the emergence of Boko Haram and their operation is a departure from the religious uprising in Northern Nigeria, as observed in the dimension of violence carried out by the sect that has never been witnessed before in the country. These activities have resulted in the death of scores of people and damage to property. Israel (2016) attributed the causes of this spate of violence to economic imbalance, psychology, political differences, and grievances among certain groups of people in the country.

Factors Responsible for the emergence of Boko Haram Insurgency Sharia Implementation

Northern Nigeria, which is predominantly Muslim, has a long history of Islamic uprising against the state. In the early nineteenth century, an Islamic preacher named Usman Dan Fodio launched a holy war against what he saw as the corrupt and unjust rule of the Hausa rulers and established the Sokoto Caliphate and Sharia law, across much of what is today Northern Nigeria (Hiskett, 1978; Agi, 1998 and International Crisis Group,

2010). After the British overthrew the Sokoto Caliphate in 1903, they incorporated the Northern region, along with the Southern territories, into the colony of Nigeria in 1914 and Lord Lugard refused to tamper with their religious belief, the colonial laws in Northern Nigeria, including criminal laws, retained some aspects of Sharia, but at independence in 1960 the new government limited Sharia law to civil matters (Lubeck, 2011).

The first four decades following independence were dominated by a series of military coups and successive military dictatorships interspersed by short lived civilian administrations. During this period, radical religious groups in the North flourished and at times came into open conflict with the ruling elite, which were increasingly seen as corrupt and abusive. One such group was the Maitatsine sect during the early 1980s, which established a large follower among the urban poor in the Northern city of Kano with its message that denounced the affluent elites as infidels, opposed Western influence and refused to recognize secular authorities (Falola, 1998).

Eleven days of violent clashes between the Maitatsine and government security forces in December 1980 left more than 4,000 dead excluding the security agencies (See: The Report of Tribunal of Inquiry on Kano Disturbances, 1981). The military crushed the uprising and its leader was killed, but over the next five years hundreds of people died in subsequent clashes between security forces and remnants of the group in several Northern cities (Cowell, 1985). Following the return to civilian rule in 1999, the clamor for Sharia in the North again intensified. Capitalizing on the mood, governors in 12 Northern states adopted legislation that added Sharia law to state penal codes (Human Right, op cit: 18). Christian minorities in the North opposed these moves. Although Sharia was added by state governments as a parallel law to existing penal codes and only applied to Muslims, Christians saw it as a step toward Islamizing the North and undermining their equal rights under a secular in the Northern city of Kaduna led clashes with Muslims, resulting in more than 2,000 deaths (Human Right Watch, 2012). Regarded by many Nigerians as a ploy by Northern governors to win popular support and with limited enforcement mechanisms, implementation of Sharia soon fizzled out in most Northern states (Cook, 2011; International Crisis Group, 2010).

Unemployment

Security challenge in the Northern Nigeria is attributed to high level of unemployment according to a survey recently conducted under the Annual NBS/CBN Collaborative Survey 2011. The survey covers all the 36 states of the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), the target population canvassed includes households, establishments and public institutions. National Bureau of Statistic (2011) defined unemployment as a person or persons (aged 15-64) who during the reference period were currently available for work, seeking for work but were without work. A person is regarded employed if he/she is engaged in the production of goods and services, thereby contributing to the gross domestic product, in a legitimate manner, which is a component of the national accounts. The category of persons considered not-in-labour-force include those without work, who are not seeking for work and/or are not available for work as well as those below or above the working age.

Poverty

If President Yar' Adua had lived and gone on to serve until 2015, which would have made for 45 years of the Northern rulership out of 55 years of Nigeria's independence, or better still 78% of the whole period of nationhood. Yet, the Northern region appears to be one of the poorest regions relatively to the Southern counterpart. In 2007, Professor Charles Soludo, who was then the Central Bank Governor articulated grim statistics to explain the seriousness of the situation. He is reported as saying, "the three Northern zones have an average poverty incidence of 70.1% as compared to 29.9 percent for three Southern zones. All the 10 states with the highest incidence of poverty are Northern states with Jigawa topping the list with 95%, Kebbi; 89.7%, Kogi; 88.6%, Bauchi; 86.3%, Kwara; 85.2%, Yobe; 83.3%, Zamfara; 80.95%, Gombe; 77.0%, Sokoto; 76.8%, Adamawa; 71.7%, respectively" (Ahmed, 2011). According to the revelation by Soludo, over 70% of the people of the North live on less than 1 dollar a day that is the equivalent to 150 Naira.

Nevertheless, the statistics on human development and social provision reveal that the population of Nigeria is increasingly becoming one of the poorest in the world and that Nigeria as a whole is in a very vulnerable position. Although, successive governments in Nigeria have at one time or the other put up a lot of poverty alleviation programmes, the World Bank's report indicated that Nigeria's Human Development Index (HDI) was only 0.416 and that about 70% of the population was vegetating below the breadline (Elumilade, 2006).

Empirical Review

Solomon (2012) in his study investigated the impact of Boko Haram insurgency on socio-economic activities with focus on Kaduna State. Eight null hypotheses and nine research questions were developed in consonance with what the study sought to find out. T-test statistics findings from the study indicated that Boko Haram activities affected economic, social and religious activities. To this end, markets, schools, churches and

mosques were close down for weeks. The hypotheses of no significant effect on Boko Haram insurgency were rejected. The study is related to the present study as both studies studied effect of Boko Haram insurgency. Both studies emphasized security and problem of security in the country particularly Northern part of Nigeria. They both used the same method of design. However, their method of analysis differs.

Nneka (2015) conducted a study on the development and validation of internal security skills and competence to eradicate Boko Haram insurgency in the North East. It was found out that the security skill/equipment including personnel management relations for effective eradication of Boko Haram need to be improved. Thus, the hypothesis of no significant relationship between personnel skills, equipment and management on officers for effective eradication of Boko Haram insurgency was rejected. The author therefore recommended that the government should regularly provide basic facilities and the needed re-having of officers to upgrade their performance. This study is related to the present study because both studies emphasized improvement of security facilities to effectively combating Boko Haram insurgency. The two studies employed the use of descriptive survey design. The method of analysis differs in the test of hypothesis. The present study used simple percentage and chi square statistics to test the guided hypothesis while the previous study used analysis of vacancies.

Again, Mohammed (2017) carried out a study that determined the extent of Boko Haram effects on security and education in the North East Nigeria. The result of the study revealed that Boko Haram activities more than anything else, have affected security and educational facilities in the North Eastern, Nigeria. The result of the study read in part: The effects of the insurgency are devastating and far-reaching. Despite the massive loss of lives and properties, it has condescend the economic situation of the country as investors are no longer investing but rather divesting; it has stopped the transportation and distribution of food; it has sowed the seed of distrust, antagonism and disunity between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria, massive depopulation of the North and overcrowding of the South is evident, damaged security and educational infrastructures of the North that were only remnants. The study is related to the present study in that both studies took place in the North Eastern Nigeria and interested in the security implications of Boko Haram insurgency particularly the validation of destruction done to the security sector in Nigeria. The difference is the choice of the study while the present study concentrates on security facilities in three Northern States of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe, this study interest is not in the entire North East.

III. METHODOLOGY

This study adopted the descriptive research survey design. The population of this study consisted of all security facilities and officers' residents from the three states in the North East. The simple random sampling technique was used to select the security personnel from each security outfit in each of the state under study and a sample size of 412 respondents was derived which was made up of 24 military officers within the ranks of commanders and 72 divisional police officers and 316 junior officers. The instrument for data collection was a self-constructed questionnaire titled "Impact Assessment of Boko Haram Insurgency on Security Facilities Questionnaire (IABISF) and the questionnaire were structured in a four-point rating scale, with response patterns of Very High Extent (VHE), High Extent (HE) Low Extent (LE) and Very Low Extent (VLE) respectively. The questionnaire was validated by two experts which were drawn from security units and one from peace and security studies department of the University of Ibadan. In order to determine the reliability of the instrument, a trail test was conducted. The questionnaire was distributed to 10 military officers, 10 police officers and 20 officers who had reached the rank of Lt. Colonel positions and Colonel in the South East Geo-Political Zone of Nigeria. The internal consistency of the instrument was computed using Cronbach Alpha Method and a reliability coefficient of 0.93 was derived. The data collected from the respondents were collected and analyzed using descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) to answer the research questions.

IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Research Question 1: To what extent did Boko Haram insurgency damage security facilities in the North-Eastern region.

Table 1: Mean and standard deviation of the respondents on the extent of damage on security facilities in the study States.

| States | Senior Military Officers | Senior Police Officers | Junior or Officers (Military Police) | Overall (N- 412) | Remarks |
|---------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|---|---------------------|---------|
| | Mean SD | Mean SD | Mean SD | Mean SD | |
| Borno | 3.960.20 | 3.820.39 | 3.570.64 | 3.630.60 | VHE |
| Adamawa | 3.790.41 | 3.350.65 | 3.120.67 | 3.200.68 | HE |
| Yobe | 3.850.53 | 3.690.83 | 2.720.72 | 2.730.74 | HE |

Extent of damage to security facilities in Borno State is shown to be very high. This finding is relative to the respondents, mean ratings on Borno State. Following the high spate of violence, about 200 State Security Services (SSS) operatives, 300 Air force personnel, 300 naval personnel's and 500 soldiers posted to Borno were killed in various attacks, somewhere disclosed while others were not officially disclosed. Following the high extent in Borno state, full strength of the task force included two battalion of soldiers, 1,500 police officers, 500 SSS operatives, 650 Air Force officers and 750 Naval officers as at 2011 (Ajani & Omonoke, 2011). Another 6,000 soldiers were deployed after emergency declaration in the area, yet the rate of damage done to security facilities is very high.

The Annual Police Report on the rate of destruction of security facilities finds relevance in this study. According to the report, Borno State has witnessed the highest attack on security facilities. From 26th July 2009 till date, security facilities are the target of attack by the terrorist group. See Appendix I - IV for further proof of this result.

Research Question 2: To what extent, does the activity of the Boko Haram insurgency affect security facilities in the North-Eastern region?

Responses and analysis of data that determine the extent of destruction of security facilities in Yobe State shows that the destruction of security facilities in Yobe State is high. As established earlier in the literature, the objective of the guerrillas is to expand its control over a wide region and spread its propaganda to reach a wider audience. As observed in Borno, attacks are mostly carefully planned, to take advantage of vulnerable military and police targets. In December 2013, the group attacked a police station in Yobe State following a dispute regarding fishing rights at a local dam. They looted the police armory and burnt down the station, including other government buildings. After the 2009 government crackdown on the group, it conducted full scale armed confrontation with the government and its security forces. In 2010, the group carried out a coordinated attack on New Year's Eve against a military barracks in Damatum town of Yobe State. Analysis of Boko Haram attacks on security facilities in Yobe State is shown in table 3 below.

Research Question 3: Does the Boko Haram insurgency impact negatively on the security facilities in North-Eastern region?

Extent of destruction of security facilities in Adamawa State. The result obtained from analysis of respondents opinion shows that the level of Boko Haram attack on security facilities in Adamawa State is relatively low when compared to Borno and Yobe State. The reason for this perhaps is because it is not major or concentrated operational base. Nevertheless, record available from military inventory, indicates that no fewer than fifteen police stations, 2 prisons quarter, one liaison office and 2 Police barracks have been destroyed. The findings reaffirmed report made available in the cause of the study investigation. See Appendix VI for further proof of this result.

Security facilities attacked Boko Haram in Adamawa State

Prisons quarters attacked:

1. Maiha prison
2. Gonye prison

Other places attacked by the group included DPO residence, Maiha Police barracks, Ganye Police barracks and Customs office Maiha were destroyed.

Source: Adamawa State Police Command, Annual Police Report, 2018.

Are the security agencies equipped to confront and combat the insurgents?

The Police lack the wherewithal to combat the insurgents. Analysis of items that sought to find out why security facilities became vulnerable to Boko Haram attacks shows a lot of factors. First, the security agencies are not equipped with modern fighting equipment to enable them confront and combat the insurgents. This position is in agreement with police report that indicated police lack of the wherewithal to combat the insurgents. As established by the study, the police are known with AK 47 rifle as the highest caliber weapon for operation. This cannot be matched with that of Anti-Aircraft (AA) guns, General Purpose Machine Guns (GPMGs), Rocket Propel Grenades (RPGs) etc. used for operations by the Boko Haram. Boko Haram is currently equipped with not only AK 47 rifles in good numbers, but also with grenades, rocket propelled grenades, automatic rifle, surface-to-air-missiles, vehicle mounted machine guns with anti-aircraft visors, T-55, panhard ERC – 90'Sagaie', and explosive such as santex.

Personnel injured or killed in the facilities from 2009 to date:

- | | | | |
|----|--------------------------|---|-----|
| a. | Officers and men killed | - | 367 |
| b. | Officers and men injured | - | 228 |

Calibre of arms carried away by the insurgents: Over 317 rifles/guns (AK 47, Assault, Pump Action, Lar, Berretta, Pistols, Riot Guns etc.).

The Police are known with AK 47 rifle as its highest caliber weapon. This cannot be matched with that of the insurgents who operations with AA guns, GPMGs, Mortar Bombs, RPGs etc. The Command communicates with other security agencies through GSM phones and written documents. Most times intelligence received by the Command is relayed to the Military for follow up action.

The importance of communication in Crime prevention cannot be under estimated. Most of the successes or otherwise achievements in the fight against crime in the Command were driven from available and effective communication. It is also pertinent to note that, there is no communication link with some of the Divisions outside the Metropolis.

The Command has thirteen (13) serviceable UHF mobile sets, twelve (12) VHF Base sets, seven (7) serviceable HF Radio, one thousand eight hundred and forty-one walkie talkies, one internet modem and other communication gadgets, for effective and efficient policing. The GOTA (Global Open Trucking Architecture) phone system in the Command is not functioning due to the damage of the Communication masts by terrorists in September, 2012 and they are yet to be rehabilitated.

Research Question 4: What are the proactive measures taken by Police/Government in preventing re-occurrences?

The former President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, His Excellency, Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, GCFR, on 14th May, 2013, declared State of Emergency in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States. The emergency rule declaration was in reaction to the growing rate of insurgency and the attendant general insecurity in some parts of the States in question located in the North East sub-region. Following this development, the bulk of the constitutional responsibility of maintenance of law and order was ceded to the military with the backup of Police and other relevant security agencies.

Consequently, the military was directed to mobilize more troops to the affected States to dislodge the insurgents and restore law and order. The military in conjunction with the Police have in compliance with the directive of the Commander-in-Chief commenced operation on Borno State.

In Borno State, military deployments started on 11th May, 2013 while the operation kicked off in earnest on 16th May, 2013. For the purpose of the operation, five (5) Units of Police Mobile Force (PMF) personnel were deployed to the Command from Kaduna, Oyo, Plateau, Lagos State and FCT. Counter Terrorists Unit (CTU) personnel were also drawn from Lagos, Rivers, Anambra, Delta, Imo, Bauchi, Enugu, Plateau, Niger States and FCT. Personnel/operatives of the Bomb Disposal Unit (BDU) were also drawn from other Commands in the Northern States to form the Police component of the counter-insurgency operations.

Since commencement of the Emergency Rule on 14th May 2013, the Command has recorded crimes ranging from attack on security personnel, selective killings/kidnapping of innocent citizens, to foil attempts and successful use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) on target locations by insurgents.

The first four months of the year up till the first half of May 2013 prior to the declaration of State of Emergency, was quite challenging. During that period there was significant rise in insurgent activities. The insurgents got more vicious in their attacks on security personnel, security and other government infrastructure to the extent that the Command suffered severe loss of personnel and Police Stations to attacks by insurgents. It was in this period (precisely 7th May, 2013) that Bama Divisional Headquarters, Bama Area Command Headquarters, 53PMF Base Bama, Headquarters 202 Battalion, Nigeria Prison, Judiciary, Bama Local Government Secretariat amongst others were attacked and destroyed. Twenty-four (24) Police Officers and eleven (11) Prisons Officers including the Chief Superintendent in-charge of Bama Prisons were also killed. The Military also had their fair share from this violent attack.

19 LGAs hitherto overrun by the insurgents were recaptured by the Military. So far, Police have returned to 17 LGAs for restoration of civil authority. Police are yet to return to the 2 LGAs – Abadam and Marte, due to ongoing Military operations.

Today, there are 47 visiting PMF units and 10 visiting CTU personnel deployed for the counter-insurgency operations. However, most of these weapons and equipment were captured from Nigeria security forces while others were obtained through global terrorist network.

The result of the analysis above further corroborated opinion of lower rank security officers who in their response agreed that poor upgrade of military hardware for anti-terrorism made security facilities and its men vulnerable to Boko Haram attack. Agbo and Suleiman (2012) had earlier observed that military officers and military facilities in the troubled North East Zone were exposed to danger of Boko Haram attack because security agencies were not equipped adequately to face the terrorist group frontally.

Consequently, security officers' disillusion with poor management of national security displayed by political leaders in not providing adequate counter-insurgency equipment caused the military to relax in their fight against Boko Haram insurgent, making military hardware vulnerable to attack. More importantly,

intelligence gathering is relayed between inter-security agencies to fight against crimes, however, communication link with other locations outside the metropolis and other security agencies is ineffective due to lack of communication gadgets. As at the time of the study, the Borno Police Command has thirteen (13) serviceable UHF mobile sets, twelve (12) VHF Base sets, seven (17) serviceable HF Radio, one thousand eight hundred and forty-one (1,841) walkie talkies, one internet modern and other phone system in the command where not functioning due to the damage of the communication masts by the terrorist group in September, 2012 and are yet to be rehabilitated.

On the issue of proactive measures taken by the security agencies and government in preventing re-occurrences, the study gathered that the government ceded to the military with the backup of police and other relevant security agencies the responsibility of maintenance of law and order. This was because, the first four months of the year up till the first half of May 2013, prior to the declaration of State of Emergency, was futile and challenging. During that period, there was significant increase in insurgent activities. The insurgents got more vicious in the attacks on security personnel, security and other government infrastructures with the result that the Command suffered severe loss of personnel and police stations to attacks by insurgents. It was in this period (precisely 7th May, 2013) that Bama Divisional Headquarters, Bama Area Command Headquarters, 53 PMF Base Bama, Headquarters 202 Army Battalion, Nigeria Prison, Judiciary, Bama Local Government Secretariat amongst others were attacked and destroyed. Twenty-four (24) police officers and men including the Divisional Police Officer, DSP Lawrence U. Eko and three (3) Civilian staff were killed. Eleven (11) prisons officers including the Chief Superintendent in charge of Bama Prisons were also killed. The military also had their fair share from this violent attack (Borno Police Command Annual Police Report, 2013).

V. CONCLUSION

The activities of the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria have presented a series of security challenges to the government and people of Nigeria, particularly the North East Region where the group fully operates. The preceding pages of this study clearly established that Boko Haram Insurgency almost completely destroy security facilities in the study area. The activities of Boko Haram have not only negatively affected the people but has also destroyed or degraded security facilities, slowed down commercial activities, development, job creation and opportunity, education and interaction in the study States. Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced from their homes and many killed as a result. Given the findings of this paper, the paper concluded that the activities of Boko Haram insurgency have affected security facilities in the study to a very high extent. The Nigerian government efforts to combat the group and restore law and order in the region have proven counterproductive for almost a decade as the group consistently engaged in guerrilla warfare against the state, the security forces and the people.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the analysis, it is essential for the government to take every step necessary to defeat and deter the growing threat of the Boko Haram insurgency in order to restore peace and in the region. The method to do this is to ensure proper coordination among the security agencies. As established in the paper various security posts were attacked on the same day, implying that existing poor coordination and communication were exploited the dreaded group to attack security facilities.

Again government should train the security officers in order to acquire modern skills needed to fight insurgency. Security agents' lack the skills especially as the tactics employ by Boko Haram appear to defy conventional methods known to the security personnel. In order to combat the group and ensure peace, all security agencies should be trained and retrained to acquire modern skills in the act of fighting insurgency. However, the Nigerian government should improve its military, capability by looking beyond the conventional way of doing things. This implies that troops committed in the fight against insurgency should be given special training on counter-insurgency operation in order to overcome the challenges posed by irregular warfare. Fighting in a complex operational environment, where the insurgents have the technical ability to make homemade bombs, improvise explosive devices (IEDs) and use them against military and civilian targets, requires a technically equipped and trained military to operate in this situation.

Furthermore, the government should with urgency provide modern and sophisticated equipments to combat the insurgency. It is established in the study that the groups had effectively carried out their destruction of security facility because of the use of highly graded weapons. It is pertinent that the government invest in acquiring modern equipment, and training facilities to enable troops to prepare and effectively operate in such environment.

Again, it is important for the government to implement adequate security measures along its borders area in order to deny the Boko Haram and other illegal networks freedom to operate freely.

The fight against insurgency and terrorist networks cannot be seen as one man's business because of its implications home and abroad. The Nigeria government ensures military operations be in harmony with neighbouring countries for proper surveillance and sharing of information to effectively fight against the group

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